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THE HEAT OF PASSION AND BLAMEWORTHY REASONS TO BE
ANGRY

Jonathan Witmer-Rich*
INTRODUCTION

This article seeks to resolve a longstanding conceptual puzzle plaguing the "heat
of passion" doctrine-how courts should determine which features, beliefs, or
characteristics of a defendant are properly relevant to assessing whether the
defendant was sufficiently provoked, and which of those features should be
disregarded. This article argues that provocation is not adequate if the reason
the defendant became extremely angry is due to some blameworthy belief or
attribute of the defendant. A belief is blameworthy if it contradicts the fundamental
values of the political community. The blameworthiness principle distinguishes
those aspects of the defendant that cannot form a basis to argue the defendant was
reasonably provoked from those aspects that can properly form the basis of a
provocation claim.
Part I introduces the "heat of passion" doctrine and briefly explains both the
conceptual problem and this article's solution. Part II more carefully examines the
nature of the "heat of passion" doctrine, focusing in particular on the second
component-whether the provocation was "reasonable" or "sufficient." Part III
frames the problem-which characteristics of a defendant should be considered
when assessing the reasonableness of provocation-by describing four example
cases that elicit differing intuitions among many commentators. Part IV considers
standards articulated by other commentators seeking to resolve this problem.
Using the examples given in Part III, Part IV also explains why each of these
standards fails to properly differentiate the cases. Part V then explains the correct
standard-that the sufficiency of the provocation must be based on whether the
defendant's reason for becoming extremely angry is itself blameworthy. Part V
also explains how this standard correctly distinguishes among the examples given,
and is grounded on the fundamental principle of culpability underlying criminal
punishment. Part VI turns to several recurring types of provocation claims: claims
by men who kill their intimate partners, and so-called "gay panic" and "trans
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panic" cases. Part VI also explains how these types of cases likewise involve the
same conceptual issue at play in cases involving minority cultural or religious
beliefs and how the "blameworthiness" principle provides the correct standard for
differentiating the few valid provocation claims in these cases from the many
invalid claims.
I.

THE PROVOCATION OR "HEAT OF PASSION" DOCTRINE

In the criminal law, the "heat of passion" doctrine is a partial defense that
reduces an offense that would otherwise constitute murder to the lesser offense of
manslaughter. 1 Also called the "provocation" doctrine, this partial defense requires
the defendant to show the following: (1) "[t]he actor must have killed while in the
heat of passion"; and (2) "[t]he heat of passion must have been brought about by
adequate provocation. " 2
Courts and commentators regularly state that the heat of passion doctrine
contains both subjective and objective components. 3 The "heat of passion"
element is subjective-the defendant must show that at the time of the killing, he
was in fact in a state of passion or extreme anger. 4 The "sufficient provocation"
element is objective, in that it depends on evaluating the defendant's extreme anger
against some objective normative standard. (The nature of that normative evalua
tion is discussed below.) If a defendant is extremely angry but lacks sufficient
provocation, the partial defense is not available. If a defendant is extremely angry
and there is sufficient provocation, the partial defense is satisfied, and the
defendant is guilty of manslaughter rather than murder.

1. See JOSHUA DRESSLER. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.07. at 530-41 (7th ed. 2015); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE. CRIMINAL LAW§ 15.2. at 1043-44 (6th ed. 2017).
2. Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell. Provocation Manslaughter as Partial Justification and Partial Excuse.
52 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1027. 1040 (2011).
3. Joshua Dressler. Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale. 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421. 427 (1982) ("The provocation defense came to include both subjective and objective
elements.'"); see California v. Oropeza. 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653. 660 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Voluntary manslaughter has
both a subjective and an objective requirement. The defendant must kill while actually in the heat of passion. That
heat of passion. however. must be aroused by sufficient provocation judged objectively.'"); State v. Shane. 590
N.E.2d 272. 276-77 (Ohio 1992); State v. Williford. 307 N.W.2d 277. 283 (Wis. 1981).
4. Jurisdictions differ in how they define what sort of state the defendant must be in. Some say "heat of
passion.'" See ALASKA STAT.§ 11.41.115(a) (2016); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 609.20(1) (West 2018). Some say "extreme
emotional disturbance.'" See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(l)(A) (2016); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(l)(a)
(West 2017); MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Some use formulations like "sudden passion
or ... sudden fit of rage.'" Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.03(A) (West 2017). or "extreme anger or extreme fear.'"
ME. STAT. tit. 17-A. § 203(l)(B) (2017). This article does not take a position on which of these emotional states is
correct.
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A. The Problem: How to Individualize the Reasonable Person
One of the questions a fact-finder must answer, in considering this partial
defense, is whether the provocation was "sufficient" 5 or "reasonable" 6 or "ad
equate.'0 Under this standard, there will be some cases in which a defendant was
indeed provoked into extreme anger, but it was not reasonable or appropriate for
him to have become so angry. Or perhaps the standard suggests that the cause of
his extreme passion was not adequate or sufficient to justify his violent conduct.
How, then, should fact-finders determine whether there was "reasonable provo
cation" in a given case? One conventional first step, relying on the "reasonable
person" who appears throughout the law, is to ask, "would a reasonable person
have been provoked into a heat of passion ?" 8
A recurring problem with this formulation is the difficulty of how much to
"individualize" the reasonable person-how to determine which characteristics of
the defendant (physical traits, emotional dispositions, past experiences, beliefs,
etc.) should be imported into this "reasonable person." 9 Obviously, the "reasonable
person" must be a person who has just experienced what the defendant experi
enced. Asking whether a "reasonable person" would have become extremely
provoked at the sight of his child being sexually assaulted presupposes that the
reasonable person is a parent who has a child, and the reasonable person has just
witnessed that child being sexually assaulted.

5. See MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-17 (2017) ("sufficient provocation''); State v. Wharton, 672 S.E.2d 786, 788
(S.C. 2009) ("sufficient legal provocation").
6. See N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:ll-4(b)(2) (West 2017) ("reasonable provocation").
7. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-1103(A)(2) (2017) ("adequate provocation").
8. See Commonwealth v. Vatcher, 781N.E.2d1277, 1281 (Mass. 2003) ("the jury must be able to infer that a
reasonable person would have become sufficiently provoked ...."); State v. Smith, 858 N.E.2d 1222, 1238 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2006) (considering whether the victim's conduct "had the potential to provoke an objectively reasonable
person into a sudden fit of passion or rage"); McClung v. Commonwealth, 212 S.E.2d 290, 292 (Va. 1975) ("[T]he
jury could have concluded that his conduct under these circumstances was sufficient to provoke a reasonable
person to fear or rage, or both."); Dressler, supra note 3, at 427; Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 471, 500 (2008) (noting that jurisdictions commonly ask "if the reasonable person in the
defendant's shoes would have been provoked into a heat of passion"); Peter Westen, Individualizing the
Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137, 139 (2008).
9. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 204-12
(2003); Guy Ben-David, The Integration of Cultural Arguments in the Provocation Doctrine in Rulings of the
Israeli Supreme Court, 2 CREIGHTON INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 2 (2011) (highlighting "the question of which of the
defendant's characteristics, if any, should be taken into account to estimate the intensity of the provocation. It may
be that a person who is a part of a minority culture will be provoked by words or actions that would not
subjectively provoke someone who is not a part of that same culture"); Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the
Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on A Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REv. 959, 986-87 (2002) (noting "an
exceptionally troubling issue .... To what extent are a defendant's subjective characteristics relevant in applying
the objective 'reasonable person' standard" in provocation cases); Orit Kamir, Responsibility Determination as a
Smokescreen: Provocation and the Reasonable Person in the Israeli Supreme Court, 2 Omo ST. J. CRIM. L. 547
(2005) (discussing the problem in Israeli jurisprudence); Timothy Macklem & John Gardner, Provocation and
Pluralism, 64 MOD. L. REv. 815 (2001); Westen, supra note 8, at 139.
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At the same time, some individual characteristics or beliefs of a defendant
should not be incorporated into the "reasonable person." For example, a defendant
who believes in white supremacy may become extremely angry at the sight of an
inter-racial couple kissing in public. In applying the provocation defense, we
would not want to ask "would a reasonable racist person have been provoked" by
this conduct, but simply "would a reasonable person" have been provoked. ' 0
The "reasonable person" formulation in provocation cases repeatedly flounders
on this deep conceptual problem: to what extent should "reasonableness" be
judged externally (from an objective perspective), and to what extent should
"reasonableness" be judged internally-from the defendant's subjective
perspective?
The Model Penal Code ("MPC'') states that provocation should be assessed
from the point of view of a reasonable person in the defendant's "situation," a
"designedly ambiguous" term that does not make clear precisely which facts about
the defendant should or should not be taken into account. 11 The commentary to the
MPC takes the view that this issue cannot be "resolved satisfactorily by abstract
definition." 12 Samuel Pillsbury states that the MPC's attempt to "join[] ... objec
tive reasonableness with individualized psychological assessment" suffers from
"incoherence." 13
Victoria Nourse suggests that the problem has no solution: "How many times
are we to be asked about 'which characteristics count' for the reasonable person in
provocation, negligence, and self-defense cases when we have long known that
such a question cannot be answered?" 14 Paul Robinson states that scholars "cannot
provide a principled theory by which to distinguish those characteristics with
which the law should individualize from those with which it should not." 15
This conceptual puzzle manifests itself in several types of recurring cases. First,
the problem emerges in cases involving minority cultural or religious beliefs.
Consider a defendant who becomes enraged-and kills-when the victim violates
a strong cultural or religious taboo not shared by the broader political commu
nity. 16 In assessing the defendant's provocation claim, should the jury ask whether
a "reasonable member of this minority cultural community" would become
extremely angry in these circumstances, or should the jury ask whether an abstract
"reasonable person" would become extremely angry?

10. Indeed. it seems inherently contradictory to speak of a "reasonable racist person.'" See Dressler. supra note
9. at 994 (noting that a racist person is "unreasonable'').
11. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
12. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES§ 210.3 cmt. 5, at 62-63 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
13. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 143, 162 (2009).
14. V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1691, 1733 (2003).
15. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Scholarship: Three Illusions, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 287, 320
(2001).
16. See infra pp. 420-22 and notes 50-52.
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Second, the problem emerges in one of the most common types of provocation
cases-men who kill their female intimate partners. 17 Feminists have rightly
criticized the provocation doctrine for, at least in some cases, mitigating the
conduct of men who abuse and kill their intimate partners by re-casting the
woman's efforts to separate from her abuser as acts of "provocation." 18 Yet
the doctrine has not been abolished, and many commentators-including some of
these critics-believe that the provocation doctrine should be available in at least
some of these cases. 19 A related problem involves so-called "gay panic" or "trans
panic" provocation claims, in which the defendant kills in response to a perceived
romantic overture from a person who is gay, lesbian, or transgender. 20
At first blush, these cases might seem conceptually unrelated to cases involving
minority cultural or religious beliefs. At a deeper level, however, these cases
likewise pose the question of whether provocation should be assessed from a
perspective internal to the defendant-such as a man who is extremely possessive
and jealous or a person who is repelled by same-sex intimacy-or from an
objective, external perspective. The possessive man who kills his wife when she
attempts to leave him does not necessarily belong to an identifiable "cultural
minority," but he is asking the jury to view the reasonableness of the provocation
from "his perspective," a perspective internal to his view of the world.2 1 That view
may include a variety of beliefs which may or may not be shared by some or all of
the broader political community, such as beliefs about proper gender roles. Dan
Kahan and Martha Nussbaum explain the problem as follows:
[T]he fact of social variation creates some delicate problems when, having
understood the evaluations that are internal to a given person's emotions, we

17. See Victoria Nourse. Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J.
1331, 1342-68 (1997).
18. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REv. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 71 (1992); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 78-79 (1991) (arguing that the law must recognize the phenomenon of
"separation assault" in order to properly view many battering men as offenders against women's freedom rather
than partial victims offemale provocation); Nourse, supra note 17, at 1384-89.
19. See Dressler, supra note 9, at 977; Nourse, supra note 17, at 1337-38, 1384-89 (criticizing the doctrine
from a feminist perspective yet arguing against the abolition of the provocation doctrine).
20. See Lee, supra note 8; Cynthia Lee & Peter Kwan, The Trans Panic Defense: Masculinity, Heteronorma
tivity, and the Murder of Transgender Women, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 77 (2014); Robert B. Mison, Comment,
Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 133
( 1992); Victoria L. Steinberg, A Heat ofPassion Offense: Emotions and Bias in "Trans Panic" Mitigation Claims,
25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 499, 523-24 (2005) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY:
DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004)).
21. See LEE, supra note 9, at 110 ("Contrary to popular perception, immigrant and racial minority defendants
are not the only ones who try to mitigate their criminal charges by relying on cultural norms. Every time a White
heterosexual male murder defendant argues he was reasonably provoked into a heat of passion by his female
partner's infidelity or by a gay man's sexual advance, he seeks to mitigate his charges by relying on cultural
norms."); Ben-David, supra note 9, at 10 ("One of the criticisms made against recognizing cultural arguments as
part of the provocation doctrine is that it improves the situation of men who killed their spouses out of jealousy.").
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then turn to the task of evaluating those evaluations for their appropriateness or
reasonableness. The facts of social variation warn us that we must ask, "Whose
ideas of reasonableness?" When we are asking about anger, for example, do we
look for our norm of reasonableness to the Utku Eskimos or to the ancient
Romans, or to some critical norm that transcends both cultures? If the answer
is that we should look to our fellow-citizens and define the emotion and its
norms as they do-by no means an obvious answer, since we might have good
reasons to think some prevailing norms unreasonable-we still must ask,
which fellow citizens, and why those? 22

This article identifies the principle that resolves this problem: the principle of
blameworthy reasons to be angry.
B. The Solution: Blameworthy Reasons to Be Angry

All of these seemingly disparate puzzles can be resolved-at a conceptual
level-by a common normative principle in the heat of passion doctrine, a
principle that has not yet been clearly articulated but which in a sense is embedded
within the doctrine.
The principle is the following: provocation is not adequate if the reason the
defendant became extremely angry is blameworthy. A belief is blameworthy if it
contradicts the fundamental values of the political community. The blameworthi
ness principle distinguishes those features of a defendant that cannot form a basis
for him to argue he was reasonably provoked from those features that can properly
form the basis of a provocation claim.
A defendant who pleads provocation asks the community to mitigate his
wrongful act of killing from murder to manslaughter, and to do so because another
person provoked him into a rage that made it much more difficult to control his
violent response. But if the defendant's reason for becoming angry is blamewor
thy, he has no rightful claim to mitigation-he is culpably responsible for entering
the state of extreme anger that might otherwise reduce his culpability. As explained
in greater detail below, this general standard solves the conceptual problem of
individualizing the reasonable person in provocation cases. It provides the hereto
fore elusive "principled theory by which to distinguish those characteristics with
which the law should individualize from those with which it should not." 23
In cases of minority religious or cultural beliefs, it is sometimes appropriate to
assess the reasonableness of the provocation from the internal perspective of that
minority religious or cultural belief system. In other cases, it is not appropriate to
take that internal perspective. The way to differentiate those cases is by assessing

22. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions ofEmotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv.
269, 297 (1996).
23. Robinson, supra note 15, at 320.
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whether the belief in question is blameworthy-whether it contradicts the funda
mental values of the political community.
A white supremacist who is provoked by seeing an inter-racial couple kiss in
public is provoked for a blameworthy reason. The belief that blacks are inferior to
whites and that they should be kept separate is a belief that itself is blameworthy
because it fails to "manifest appropriate respect ... for the interests of others." 24
The white supremacist is asking the community to mitigate his wrongful act of
killing from murder to manslaughter, and to do so because another person
provoked him into a rage that made it much more difficult for him to control his
violent response. But the white supremacist's reason for becoming extremely
angry is itself blameworthy, and thus he has no rightful claim to mitigation; he is
culpably responsible for entering the state of extreme anger that might otherwise
reduce his culpability.
A defendant who relies on a cultural or religious belief that is not blameworthy
stands in a different position. Consider the famous case of Regina v. Gibson, an
Aboriginal defendant who killed another tribesman for violating a tribal taboo and
"talking men's talk" before uninitiated boys. 25 The Aboriginal defendant is asking
the community to mitigate his wrongful act of killing from murder to manslaugh
ter, and to do so because another person provoked him into a rage that made it
much more difficult for him to control his violent response. Unlike the white
supremacist, it appears that the Aboriginal man's tribal taboo-against "talking
men's talk" in front of uninitiated boys-is not blameworthy. It may not be a belief
that the broader political community itself shares or endorses, but neither does it
conflict with any of the broader community's fundamental values. Thus, the
Aboriginal man may have a claim for mitigation, for he is not culpably responsible
for entering the state of extreme anger that itself reduces his level of culpability.
The concept of "blameworthy reasons to be angry" also provides the correct
normative standard for assessing controversial cases such as men killing their
intimate female partners or cases of so-called "gay panic" or "trans panic." When
defendants in these cases argue that they were provoked, and that their extreme
anger was reasonable, the law should respond by determining whether (and to
what extent) their anger is based on blameworthy beliefs or attitudes - attitudes
that fail to manifest appropriate respect for gay or trans persons and violate the
political community's commitment to gender and sex equality.
In some of these cases, a jury may determine that the defendant was partly
motivated by blameworthy beliefs or attitudes, and partly by beliefs or attitudes
that are not blameworthy. The infamous case of Bedder v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, 26 discussed below in Part VI, may be one such case. These "mixed"

24. But see Westen. supra note 8. at 140.
25. See JOSHUA DRESSLER. CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 283 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing Regina v.
Gibson (unpublished opinion)); infra note 50.
26. [1954] 2 All ER 801. 1WLR1119 (UK).
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cases constitute some of the most difficult provocation cases for courts and
commentators to properly assess. Commentators viewing such cases from one
angle have sympathy for the defendant (and wish to permit the provocation claim),
whereas commentators viewing such cases from another angle condemn the
defendant (and wish to deny the provocation claim). 27
The concept of blameworthiness allows us to consider both of these perspec
tives and reach a principled judgment. To the extent that part of the defendant's
motivation is blameworthy and part of it is not, we should exclude the blamewor
thy part and evaluate the sufficiency of the provocation based solely on the
non-blameworthy reasons that the defendant became extremely angry.
This general principle distinguishes, at a conceptual level, those features of a
defendant that are properly relevant from those that are not properly relevant. Of
course, the general principle of "blameworthiness" will itself be subject to
disagreement in a diverse, pluralistic society. The principle will not yield a simple
or obvious answer in every case, and reasonable people may disagree about when
the reason (including the belief or attribute that underlies the reason) was itself
blameworthy. But "blameworthiness" does provide the correct normative standard
within which these debates should occur.
Related is the question of mechanics---disagreements about what counts as
"blameworthy" might be assigned to legislatures, judges, or juries (or a mix of all
of the above). For example, legislatures could step in to define at least some of the
reasons that are blameworthy and unacceptable, such as homophobia, racism,
religious prejudice, and sexism. Alternatively, legislatures could leave the job of
assessing blameworthiness entirely to juries, or judges could screen out clear
cases, leaving debatable cases to juries. 28
Both of these issues-disagreements over what is blameworthy and which legal
institutions are best suited to resolving those disagreements-are substantial, and I
do not claim to resolve them here.
Nevertheless, the "blameworthiness" standard resolves, at a conceptual level,
the problem of which traits of the defendant should or should not be considered. It
properly directs commentators, judges, and juries away from the confounding
question-which characteristics of the defendant should be imported onto the
"reasonable person"-and toward the correct question-is this particular defen
dant's reason for becoming extremely angry blameworthy?
Finally, much ink has been spilled debating whether the provocation partial
defense is an excuse defense, a justification defense, or a partial justification and
partial excuse. 29 For purposes of this article, it is not necessary to take a position on

27. See Nourse. supra note 17. at 1402--03 (discussing both views).
28. See Lee. supra note 8. at 549-57 (arguing that implicit bias is best combatted by permitting the issues to be
argued and aired before the jury. rather than having the legislature or judge prohibit the jury from considering
controversial issues).
29. See Berman & Farrell. supra note 2. at 1046--65 (describing the literature).
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this debate. Commentators who take each of these views nevertheless seem to
recognize that the "reasonable provocation" component requires a normative
assessment of the defendant's emotional response, 30 and it is that normative
assessment that is analyzed here. Whether that normative assessment is in the
nature of an excuse, 31 a justification, 32 both excuse and justification, 33 or some
thing else, 34 is unnecessary to resolve for present purposes.

II.

HEAT OF PASSION DOCTRINE AND THE COMPONENT OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION

As noted above, the heat of passion doctrine contains two basic components.
First, the defendant "must have killed while in a heat of passion" or state of
extreme emotional disturbance. Second, the heat of passion or emotional distur
bance must have resulted from "adequate provocation." 35
The first component is a relatively straightforward factual inquiry, although
different jurisdictions use different standards for what types of emotional states
qualify for this defense. Common formulations are that the defendant must be in a
"heat of passion," 36 or a state of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance." 37 The
differences among these formulations are not relevant for purposes of this article,
which focuses on the second-normative-component of the partial defense.

30. See infra note 423-437.
31. See Joshua Dressler. Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?. 51 MOD. L. REv. 467 (1988);
Dressler. supra note 9; Peter Westen. How Not to Argue That Reasonable Provocation ls an Excuse. 43 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 175 (2009).
32. See Berman & Farrell. supra note 2. at 1055 n. l 09 (listing articles in support of the "partial justification''
view).
33. See id. at 1033-35.
34. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 22, at 318-21 (contending that the traditional categories of excuse and
justification both fail to adequately explain the provocation doctrine, as they presuppose a mechanistic conception
of emotion).
35. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 2, at 1040. Courts and commentators often list more than two elements,
but these alternative formulations reflect the same fundamental approach. For example, Wayne LaFave states that
the defendant must establish the following elements:
(1) There must have been a reasonable provocation.
(2) The defendant must have been in fact provoked.
(3) A reasonable person so provoked would not have cooled off in the interval of time between the
provocation and the delivery of the fatal blow....
(4) [T]he defendant must not in fact have cooled off during that interval.
LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 1028; see also DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 530 (listing four elements).
This language reflects the same fundamental principles as stated in the two-part test above. Elements (2) and
(4) in the LaFave formulation are both implicitly present in the first element above, that the actor must have killed
while in the heat of passion. Killing while in the heat of passion implies that the defendant was in fact provoked
into a heat of passion, and that he had not in fact cooled off but was still in a heat of passion. Elements ( 1) and
(3) in the LaFave formulation are both implicitly present in the second element above, that the heat of passion was
brought about by adequate provocation. The notion of "adequate provocation" can encompass both the idea that
the provocation was "reasonable," as well as the notion that a reasonable person would not have cooled off but
would still be in a heat of passion.
36. See Dressler, supra note 3, at 431 n.102.
37. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see Dressler, supra note 3, at 431 & n.105.
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The normative aspect of the heat of passion doctrine comes in the second
component, and it is here that courts and commentators struggle to determine
which of the defendant's traits should be considered and which should not.
Jurisdictions commonly provide that the provocation must be "reasonable," 38
"sufficient," 39 "serious," 40 or "adequate."41 All of these terms are meant to set a
normative standard. A defendant who kills due to a provocation that is not
reasonable, sufficient, serious, or adequate cannot use the heat of passion defense.
For present purposes, not much seems to turn on which of these terms is
used-they are not clearly defined terms with consistent (or consistently different)
meanings from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
States use a variety of formulations to try to further articulate when provocation
is adequate or sufficient. Some appear to ask whether a reasonable person would be
incited into using deadly force, or whether the use of deadly force is a reasonable
response to the provocation. 42 Ohio, for example, requires that there be "serious
provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the
person into using deadly force." 43
Many courts and commentators have criticized this approach, noting that even
when a defendant successfully pleads heat of passion, he is still adjudged guilty of
manslaughter, which is a serious felony offense. 44 Thus it seems to be a mistake to
inquire whether a reasonable person would have killed or whether the killing was a
reasonable response. The crime of manslaughter represents the judgment that a
killing in the heat of passion is not reasonable, for it remains a serious crime. 45
Other states recognize that the use of deadly force in a manslaughter case is
never reasonable, and focus instead on whether the defendant's extreme emotional

38. See N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C: ll-4(b)(2) (West 2017) ("reasonable provocation'').
39. See Miss. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-17 (2017) ("sufficient provocation"); State v. Wharton, 672 S.E.2d 786, 788
(S.C. 2009) ("sufficient legal provocation").
40. ALASKA STAT.§ 11.41.115(a) (2016) ("serious provocation").
41. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 13-1103(A)(2) (2017) ("adequate provocation").
42. See State v. McGuy, 841A.2d1109, 1113 (R.I. 2003) (assessing whether the provocation "was 'so gross' as
to cause an ordinary reasonable person to lose his self-control and to use deadly force with fatal results"); W. VA.
CRIMINAL LAW RESEARCH CTR., W. VA. PUB. DEF. SERVS., WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 112 cmt. 2
(6th ed. 2003) ("The term 'provocation', as it is used to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter, consists of
certain types of acts committed against the defendant which would cause a reasonable man to kill.").
43. Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 2903.03(A) (West 2017).
44. People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1130 (Cal. 2013), as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 28, 2013);
Dressler, supra note 3, at 467-68; Westen, supra note 8, at 155 & n.62 (citing commentators making this point).
45. There is another, more charitable way to interpret a statute like that of Ohio. Perhaps Ohio does not mean to
ask jurors to determine whether the provocation would have caused a reasonable person to kill, but rather whether
the provocation would cause reasonable person to feel a strong impulse to kill. See Kamir, supra note 9, at 549
(noting that under Israeli law, the doctrine depends on "whether the reasonable person, placed in the defendant's
shoes, would have been likely to kill as a result of the provocation") (emphasis added). This is different from
asking whether a reasonable person would in fact kill. The language of the Ohio statute does not clearly
differentiate between these two concepts, so it is not clear whether this reading of Ohio law is correct.
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reaction was reasonable. 46 Some of these states use a "reasonable person" test,
asking whether the provocation "is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion
in a reasonable person." 47
Some states focus on the actual defendant, rather than a reasonable person, and
then ask whether the defendant's emotional reaction was "reasonable." Connecti
cut asks whether there was a "reasonable explanation or excuse" for the defen
dant's extreme emotional reaction, and explains that the reasonableness of the
response "is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's
situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be." 48 The
California Supreme Court states, "[p]rovocation is adequate only when it would
render an ordinary person of average disposition 'liable to act rashly or without
due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.' " 49
Under all of these standards, the normative question remains: what makes an
extreme emotional response (however defined) "reasonable"?
Ill.

FRAMING THE PROBLEM: CONFLICTING INTUITIONS

Courts and commentators struggle to determine when a defendant's cultural or
religious beliefs should be considered when evaluating the sufficiency of provoca
tion. A number of commentators have proposed standards purporting to draw the
correct boundary between beliefs that should be considered and those that should
be rejected. Part III describes four specific cases designed to elicit different
intuitions about whether a defendant's cultural or religious beliefs should be
considered when assessing the adequacy of the provocation. Part IV then turns to
standards articulated by previous commentators, and explains why each standard
fails to properly differentiate between the cases described in Part III.
To test the reader's intuitions, and to evaluate tests proposed by previous
commentators, the following four cases will be considered. Each example is a case
in which the defendant's extreme anger is the result of him holding a particular
cultural or religious belief shared by his particular religious, ethnic, or cultural

46. See People v. Steele. 47 P.3d 225. 240 (Cal. 2002) (stating that the question is whether "the facts and
circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable man'') (quotation and citation
omitted); State v. Flick, 425 A.2d 167, 173 (Me. 1981) (finding trial court was correct in "directing the jury to
decide whether it was reasonable for [the defendant] to react with extreme anger or fear").
47. 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-2(a), (b) (West 2017). Maryland's standard is similar. "[F]or a provocation to
be 'adequate,' it must be 'calculated to inflame the passion of a reasonable [person] and tend to cause [that person]
to act for the moment from passion rather than reason."' Dennis v. State, 661A.2d175, 179 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1995) (alterations in original).
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a (West 2017). New York law is similar: "Penal Law § 125.25(l)(a)
provides that it is an affirmative defense to the crime of murder in the second degree that ' [t]he defendant acted
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be."' People v. Harris, 740 N.E.2d 227, 229 (N.Y. 2000)
(alteration in original).
49. Beltran, 301 P.3d at 1136.
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group, but not widely shared by the entire political community. Some variations on
these examples are mentioned in the footnotes.
1. Aboriginal Man. An Australian Aboriginal defendant kills another Aborigi
nal man after that man "talks men's talk" in front of young boys who have
not yet been initiated. Both men are members of an Aboriginal tribe that
contains a strong taboo against speaking about certain tribal secrets in front
of uninitiated members. 50
2. White Supremacist. A defendant belongs to (and was raised in) the Aryan
Nation, a community of interest gathered around the idea that the Caucasian
(or Aryan) race is superior to, and should be kept separate from, other racial
groups. The defendant sees an inter-racial couple kissing in public, becomes
enraged, and kills an African-American man who was kissing a Caucasian
woman.
3. Devout Catholic. A devout Catholic who works at a church observes a man
desecrating the church. The man urinates on the altar and decapitates the
statues of holy saints in the church. The devout Catholic becomes enraged
and kills the man. 51
4. Conservative Pakistani Father. A conservative Pakistani man strangles his
daughter after she rejects her father's arranged marriage. The man's ethnic
community has a very strong social norm that daughters always show honor
and deference to their fathers, including with respect to the father's choice
of an arranged marriage, and that a daughter who rejects an arranged
marriage brings great shame and dishonor on her family and in particular on
her father. 52

In Case I -the Aboriginal Man-many persons, including myself, have the
intuition that the Aboriginal Man's conduct should be judged by the jury from the
perspective of a reasonable Aboriginal man who shares the Aboriginal cultural

50. This example is taken from DRESSLER. supra note 25. which draws the example from the actual case of
Regina v. Gibson (unpublished). See Robert L. Misner. The Awkward Case of Harry Gibson. 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
691 (1986).
51. This example is based on a fictional account by Roberto Bolafio. See ROBERTO BOLAND. 2666 361-81
(Natasha Wimmer trans.. 2008). A sample of Bolafio"s account: "Two days later. the stranger got into the church of
Santa Catalina. in Colonia Lomas del Toro. late at night when the building was closed. and he urinated and
defecated on the altar. as well as decapitating almost all the statues in his path. This time. the story made the
national news and a reporter from La Vaz de Sonora dubbed the attacker the Demon Penitent.'" Id. at 367.
A similar case: an antagonist throws a pigskin shoe at a devout Muslim. knowing that the assault with take on
particular force because of the Muslim religious view that pig products are forbidden (haram). See Macklem &
Gardner. supra note 9. at 818.
52. This example is also taken from Joshua Dressler. who draws the example from a news article describing an
actual criminal case involving similar facts in Chicago. DRESSLER. supra note 25. at 283-84. A similar example
involves a conservative Muslim defendant who killed his wife in a rage after she made a comment suggesting she
might be having an affair. R. v. Humaid. [2006] 81O.R.3d456 (Can. Ont. C.A.). The defense introduced evidence
that traditional Muslim men live in a culture that is "male dominated. preoccupied with the concept of 'family
honour,' and particularly intolerant of female infidelity." Rosemary Cairns Way, Culture, Religion and the
Ordinary Person: An Essay on R. v. Humaid, 41 OTTAWA L. REv. 1, 7 (2009).
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beliefs about "talking men's talk." 53 If not-if the jury simply asked whether a
reasonable person of the dominant culture (Australian, in that case, or in our
context American) would be provoked into extreme passion by a man "talking
men's talk" in front of uninitiated children, the answer would be an easy and
obvious "No." That approach seems unsatisfactory. It seems to somehow punish
the Aboriginal defendant for holding a minority cultural belief.
Of course, judging this case from the perspective of an Aboriginal man does not
mean that this particular defendant will prevail, or that the fact-finder will
conclude that the provocation was adequate. Reasonable people may disagree
about that ultimate issue, and the resolution will likely depend on the particular
facts and testimony, including more detail than is presented above about the nature
of the "talking men's talk" taboo. But in terms of framing the question, many agree
that the fact-finder should take into account the Aboriginal Man's cultural beliefs
when assessing the adequacy of the provocation.
In Case 2, many people, including myself, have the strong intuition that the
Aryan Nation adherent's conduct should not be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable Aryan Nation adherent who shared the Aryan Nation's cultural beliefs
about white supremacy. 54 Indeed, that very formulation prompts the objection that
there is no such thing as a "reasonable" Aryan Na ti on adherent. 55 The identifying
characteristic itself-belief in white supremacy-renders the Aryan Nation adher
ent inherently unreasonable. Instead, the jury should determine whether a reason
able person (of the dominant culture, who does not believe in white supremacy)
would have been provoked into extreme anger at the sight of inter-racial kissing in
public. And the answer to that question is an easy, obvious "No." Several
commentators have the same intuition for a homophobic man who kills in a rage
caused by a perceived sexual advance from another man. 56
The puzzle is why the views of the Aryan Nation adherent-who holds a
cultural belief not shared by the broader community-cannot be considered by the
jury, whereas the views of the Aboriginal Man-who likewise holds a cultural
belief not shared by the broader community-can be considered by the jury. Why
do we think it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a "reasonable Aryan Na ti on
adherent" but not a contradiction in terms to speak of a "reasonable Aboriginal
Man," even though the dominant culture does not share the relevant cultural belief
of either defendant?
The remaining two examples may provoke similar responses. Case 3, the
Devout Catholic, seems more like the Aboriginal Man. The broad political

53. Dressler. supra note 9. at 996. In the actual case. the judge did so instruct the jury. See DRESSLER. supra
note 25. at 283 (citing Misner. supra note 50. at 708-10).
54. See, e.g .. Dressler. supra note 9. at 994-95.
55. See id. at 994.
56. See, e.g.. Lee. supra note 8. at 564; Mison. supra note 20; J. Kelly Strader et al.. Gay Panic, Gay Victims,
and the Case for Gay Shield Laws. 36 CARDOZO L. REv. 1473. 1501--02 (2015).
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community does not necessarily share the Devout Catholic's views about the
sacredness of the church and its statues. That belief is surely more common (in,
say, the United States) than the Aboriginal Man's views on talking men's talk (even
in Australia). But it does not seem appropriate that the result should depend on
whether the Devout Catholic's conduct occurred in Rhode Island (51 % Catholic)
or in Mississippi (4.7% Catholic). 57 Regardless of whether the broader political
community is predominantly Catholic or not, it seems clear that the jury should ask
whether there was adequate provocation from the perspective of a reasonable
devout Catholic, and not from the perspective of a reasonable person with no
particular religious beliefs. Many have similar intuitions about a devout Muslim
assaulted by a pigskin shoe. 58
For Case 4, the Conservative Pakistani Father, I have the intuition that the father
who kills his daughter for refusing to consent to an arranged marriage should not
be permitted to have the jury judge his extreme anger from the perspective of a
"reasonable conservative Pakistani man," but should be judged from the perspec
tive of a reasonable person who holds appropriate values about individual
autonomy and sexual and gender equality. The Court of Appeal for Ontario
reasoned just this way in the case of Adi Humaid, a defendant in a Canadian case
who killed his wife after she made a comment that he interpreted as suggesting she
was having an affair. 59 The defense called an expert who "described Islamic culture as
male dominated, preoccupied with the concept of 'family honour,' and particularly
intolerant of female infidelity."60 The Court of Appeal for Ontario recognized the
troubling nature of this claim: "[T]he alleged beliefs which give the insult added
gravity are premised on the notion that women are inferior to men and that
violence against women is in some circumstances accepted, if not encouraged.
These beliefs are antithetical to fundamental Canadian values, including gender
equality. " 61
IV.

ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM: CRITIQUES

A variety of commentators have attempted to articulate standards differentiating
between those cases in which a defendant's individual characteristics or beliefs
should be taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of provocation and
those in which the defendant's individual characteristics or beliefs should not. Part
IV considers various proposals and explains how each falls short of providing a
convincing general account.

57. See John Green. State-by-State Percentage of White Evangelicals, Catholics, and Black Protestants.
BELIEFNET. https://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/2004/ 11/State-By-State-Percentage-Of-White-Evangelicals-C
atholics-And-Black-Protestants.aspx (last visited Feb. 15. 2018).
58. See Macklem & Gardner. supra note 9. at 818.
59. Way. supra note 52. at 7-8.
60. Id. at 7.
61. R. v. Humaid. [2006] 81 O.R. 3d 456. 480 para. 93 (Can. Ont. C.A.); see also Way. supra note 52. at 11.
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A. Gravity of the Provocation and Self-Control
Andrew Ashworth addresses how to "individualize" the abstract "reasonable
man" in provocation cases. 62 He argues that under the provocation doctrine, "[t]he
law's paramount concern is to ascertain whether the accused showed a reasonable
amount of self-restraint." 63
Ashworth notes that the "reasonable man" test conflates two issues. 64 First, the
term "reasonable" seems to suggest a judgment of "reasonable self-control." 65
Second, the phrase "reasonable man" "begs questions about the age, sex, marital
status, race, colour, religion and other personal characteristics of a hypothetical
individual." 66
Ashworth notes that many individual characteristics of the defendant must be
taken into account to make sense of the "provocation." 67 The sight of two persons
engaging in sexual intercourse is not "grave provocation," but it might be for
someone who is married to one of the participants. 68 Likewise, "to say that
throwing a pigskin shoe is a grave provocation would be incorrect as a general
proposition," but it might be a grave provocation given that both persons involved
were Muslims, which substantially magnifies the degree ofprovocation. 69
Thus, we must assess "the 'gravity' of provocation ... in relation to persons in a
particular situation or group.' 00 Accordingly, Ashworth argues, "it is essential and
inevitable that the accused's personal characteristics should be considered by the
court." 71
At the same time, Ashworth argues, the court must also disregard certain traits
of the defendant. "If it is accepted that a primary purpose of the 'reasonable man'
test is to ascertain whether the accused showed reasonable self-control in the face
of the provocation given, then it follows that individual deficiencies of tempera
ment and mentality must be left out of [the] account." 72
Ashworth thus recognizes that courts must make a normative judgment about
the appropriateness of the defendant's response. To make that normative judgment,
Ashworth proposes the following rule: "The proper distinction, it is submitted, is
that individual peculiarities which bear on the gravity of the provocation should be
taken into account, whereas individual peculiarities bearing on the accused's level

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

A.J. Ashworth. The Doctrine of Provocation. 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292. 299 (1976).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of self-control should not. ,m
Ashworth's rejection of "individual peculiarities bearing on the accused's level
of self-control" seems sound. The concept of "reasonable" or "adequate" provoca
tion suggests a judgment about whether the defendant's response was in some way
proper. If the reason for the extreme anger is itself a feature of the defendant that
demonstrates improper sensitivity for the interests of others, then the provocation
was not "reasonable." Thus, a defendant who lacks self-control can be faulted for
exactly that feature of his character.
The first part of Ashworth's test, however, is too broad. Ashworth suggests that
"individual peculiarities which bear on the gravity of the provocation should be
taken into account." Consider the examples in Part III under this standard. Both the
White Supremacist and the homophobic man have "individual peculiarities"-a
strong belief in white supremacy, and homophobia, respectively-which "bear on
the gravity of the provocation." The provocation of the White Supremacist does
not necessarily stem from his level of self-control. He might be a relatively
cool-tempered person as a general matter. If so, it is not his short temper, but his
deep moral commitment to white supremacy, that explains his response.
Accordingly, there are some cases (such as the White Supremacist, the Conser
vative Pakistani Father, and the homophobic man) in which the defendant's
"individual peculiarities which bear on the gravity of the provocation" 74 do not
seem properly relevant. Ashworth's test fails to allow us to reject the claims of
those defendants.
B. Insults That "Really Are Insulting"

Timothy Macklem and John Gardner ask, "What is the best way to reflect
human diversity in the structure of the provocation defence ... ?" 75 They helpfully
break the problem down into three distinct inquiries by proposing the following
test: "first, was there an action capable of constituting a provocation? Second, how
provocative was it? And third, how much self-control should have been exhibited
in the face of it?" 76
To answer the first question, Macklem and Gardner note that "courts have
clearly been right to warn juries in provocation cases that different words and
deeds have different significance for different defendants." 77 As Ashworth also
recognized, this is because the defendant "might inhabit a different social milieu
from the jury ... , and so might participate in a different menu of possible slights
and put-downs." 78 For example, "[t]he fact that the defendant is a Muslim, say, can

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Macklem & Gardner. supra note 9. at 815.
Id.
Id. at 818.
Id.; see also Ashworth. supra note 62. at 300.
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be pertinent to the question of whether there was a provocation only if there is a
Muslim social milieu in which there is a distinctive menu of possible insults." 79
After determining whether there was some action "capable of constituting a
provocation," the second question is "whether she really should have been
provoked by it as she was." 80 This raises two subsidiary issues. The first is
"whether the things that are intelligible as insults in a particular cultural milieu
really are insulting." 81 The second issue is "how serious (or grave) an insult a
certain insult is. " 82
Ultimately, however, their analysis fails to adequately allow courts and juries to
distinguish cases appropriately. The problem with Macklem and Gardner's scheme
is how we are to assess whether a particular insult "really is insulting." At this
point in the analysis, it is clear that Macklem and Gardner are imposing a
normative standard. For example, the "question of whether being called 'queer"'
comes down to the "question of whether it really is an insult at all." 83 This
depends, they argue, on "whether [the defendant] should have been angered by it at
all." 84 Later they explain: "[i]t is not a matter of why one lost one's temper, but a
matter of why one should have lost it." 85 "Should" is the operative word here,
demonstrating that whether an insult "really is an insult at all" depends on applying
some normative assessment of what properly counts as an insult. Macklem and
Gardner thus argue:
These remarks expose the limited way in which a defendant's personal
idiosyncrasies can bear on the gravity of the provocation. It is not that he has
his own judgment of what is insulting, ... a judgment that needs somehow to
be respected or accommodated by the law. His judgment in these matters is no
more authoritative than that of his or any other community: he and all his peers
might wrongly think that homosexuality is obnoxious and so might become
quite unjustifiably enraged. 86

Accordingly, "[t]he mere fact that the parties or their peers or indeed all the
inhabitants of their social milieu think the words or deeds insulting, ... does not
even begin to make them so." 87 Instead, "[a]n insult is only as insulting as it really
is, when addressed to this defendant in these circumstances. No amount of thinking
it more insulting, on the part of the defendant or his peers or society at large, can

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Macklem & Gardner. supra note 9. at 818.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 821.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 824.
Id. at 822-23.
Id. at 823.
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make it more insulting." 88
The notion that a particular insult "really is insulting" (or "really is not
insulting") suggests that the insult must be evaluated from some objective
standpoint-at least, from a standpoint removed from the internal views of the
culture or personal beliefs of the defendant. But Macklem and Gardner do not
explain what that objective standpoint should be, or how it applies.
Consider a Muslim defendant. In one case, the defendant becomes enraged and
kills his wife after hearing a suggestion that she might be having an affair with
another man. 89 Is this "really" a grave insult or not, given testimony claiming that
traditional Muslim men are extremely sensitive to female infidelity?
Compare that Muslim defendant to a Muslim defendant who becomes enraged
and kills after being assaulted by a person who throws a shoe made of pigskin,
knowing that the Muslim man will experience additional insult and anger due to
the violation of his religious prohibition against pigskin. Is that "really" a grave
insult or not, given testimony about the Muslim religious prohibition?
Many would like to distinguish the first case from the second. Macklem and
Gardner do not provide a standard for resolving this normative judgment, but only
illustrate that there is a judgment to be made.
C. Reasons Shared by the Political Community

Victoria Nourse and Peter Westen have separately addressed this problem and
each proposed a test to resolve it. The two tests are distinct, but they share a
common approach: both ask whether the defendant's reason for becoming ex
tremely angry is a reason shared or endorsed by the broader political community. 90
Nourse relays the following story: "After days of deliberation in a case in which
a defendant killed a man who had parked in his parking place, one jury summed up
its confusion about the [provocation] defense by sending a note to the judge,
asking, Whose norms apply, his or ours?" 91 Nourse and Westen each (in their own
way) resoundingly reply: "Ours!"
This common approach avoids the problem created by Ashworth's test, in that it
denies the provocation defense to individuals-like the White Supremacist-who
become enraged due to certain objectionable personal beliefs.
But both Nourse's test and Westen's test fail to allow a jury to distinguish
between a case like White Supremacist and a case like the Aboriginal Man. Under
their respective tests, the law would deny the Aboriginal Man access to the
provocation partial defense, because the broader political community likely does

88. Id.
89. See R. v. Humaid. [2006] 81 O.R. 3d 456 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
90. See also LEE. supra note 9. at 238 ("A more difficult inquiry. but one which better addresses the question of
reasonableness as something more than whatever happens to be popular. is whether the judge or jury ought to give
society's stamp of approval to the defendant"s actions.'") (emphasis added).
91. Nourse. supra note 17. at 1372.
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not share or endorse the Aboriginal Man's reason for becoming extremely
angry-his response to a violation of the "talking men's talk" taboo. The same
seems true for the Devout Catholic, or the Muslim Man assaulted by a pigskin
shoe.
Nourse argues for the following standard: "[t]o merit the reduction of verdict
typically associated with manslaughter, the defendant's claim to our compassion
must put him in a position of normative equality vis-a-vis his victim." 92 This
means, Nourse explains, that the defense should be available "when the defendant
appeals to the very emotions to which the state appeals to rationalize its own use of
violence. " 93 In other words, courts should look to the criminal prohibitions in the
jurisdiction-which are the circumstances in which the state claims proper
authority to apply criminal punishment to its citizens-to assess permissible
reasons for becoming provoked. 94
Nourse uses a variety of examples to illustrate how this standard works. Two of
her examples, briefly stated, are as follows:
1. Rapist Killer. A woman is raped by Rapist. After the rape is complete, and
when Rapist is departing, the woman kills Rapist in a fit of rage. 95
2. Departing Wife Killer. A man kills his wife in a fit of rage after she
announces that she is leaving him and will seek a divorce. 96

In the case of the Rapist Killer, Nourse argues that "we feel 'with' the killer
because she is expressing outrage in ways that communicate an emotional
judgment (about the wrongfulness of rape) that is uncontroversially shared,
indeed, that the law itself recognizes." 97 The defendant's "sense of emotional
wrongfulness" is reflected in "the law's own sense of appropriate retribution." 98
"In this sense, the defendant is us." 99 Thus, Nourse is claiming that provocation
may be "sufficient" or "reasonable" in cases in which the community (here, as
reflected in the law) shares the defendant's judgment about the rightness of her
anger.

92. Id. at 1396. Earlier Nourse states the test as follows: "The passion defense should be retained as a partial
excuse but only in the limited set of cases in which the defendant and the victim stand on an equal emotional and
normative plane.'" Id. at 1337.
93. Id. at 1338.
94. Id. at 1392-93.
95. Id. at 1390-91. A rape victim who kills before or during rape will likely have a valid self-defense claim. as
the victim of a rape almost surely faces (or reasonably believes she faces) an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily harm. But if the rapist is departing. that imminent threat may no longer exist. and self-defense may not
apply. Nourse"s "Rapist Killer'' hypothetical appears to be designed to suggest that the victim is not acting in
self-defense, but may still successfully plead the heat of passion partial defense.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1392.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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In the case of the Departing Wife Killer, the defendant "asks us to share in the
idea that leaving merits outrage." 100 But that is not a claim the community-as
reflected in the law-shares. On the contrary, "the law tells us quite the opposite:
that departure, unlike rape and battery and robbery, merits protection rather than
punishment." 101
Nourse argues that provocation is sufficient when a defendant "respond[s] with
a rage shared by the law." 102 In these cases, the defendant is not simply making "a
claim for sympathy," but rather making "a claim of authority and a demand for our
concurrence." 103 The defendant "asks that we share his judgments of emotional
blame." 104
Like Nourse, Peter Westen argues that the fact-finder must not adopt the
defendant's internal values about when it is right to become extremely angry, but
must make its own normative judgment. Also like Nourse, Westen asks whether
the community shares or endorses the defendant's rage. Beyond those points of
agreement, Westen's proposal differs from Nourse's.
Westen argues that the reasonableness of provocation should be assessed by a
normative judgment involved in much of criminal law-the defendant's
blameworthiness. 105
Westen's first insight is that courts and commentators are starting with the
wrong question: "[t]he question is not, 'To what extent should an idealized
'reasonable person' be 'individualized' with a defendant's individual traits (or
'contextualized,' 'subjectivized' or 'relativized,' as some commentators put
it)...." 106 This question mistakenly suggests that the answer lies in figuring out
which of an individual's traits are relevant and which are not relevant, as compared
with an abstract "reasonable person." "[T]his effort to solve a problem of
culpability by focusing on certain physical, psychological and emotional traits
shifts attention away from the essential nature of blame itself." 107
Westen argues the courts should not attempt to "individualize" the abstract
reasonable person with some of the defendant's traits and features, but rather
should begin with the actual defendant and then apply the appropriate moral filter
to evaluate that particular defendant's reaction. 108

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1393.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Westen. supra note 8. at 151.
106. Id. at 140.
107. Id. at 148.
108. Id. at 140. Nourse. in effect. seems to be making the same basic move-attempting to identify the
appropriate moral filter to apply to the defendant"s extreme anger. rather than focus on which characteristics of the
defendant should or should not be imported onto the reasonable person.
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The reasonableness of a defendant's extreme anger-that is to say, the reason
ableness of the provocation---depends on the "actor's blameworthiness." 109 Declar
ing an actor blameworthy, Westen explains, "is to adjudge that, rather than being
motivated in his conduct by proper regard for interests that the law seeks to
safeguard, the person placed insufficient value on those interests." 110
Accordingly, Westen proposes that blameworthiness be assessed as follows:
"What would a person, who otherwise possessed every trait of the actor but fully
respected the interests that the statute at hand seeks to protect, have thought and/or
felt on the occasion at issue?" 111
Translating this into the specific context of the heat of passion doctrine, Westen
argues that the key question is, "Given everything that makes a defendant who he
empirically is-that is, every physical trait, historical experience, and emotional
disposition that constitutes him-does his inadvertence or extreme emotional
agitation nevertheless manifest appropriate respect on his part for the interests of
others?" 112
Westen also proposes jury instructions designed to enable a jury to take into
account all relevant parts of the defendant's background, experience, and personal
traits, while excluding certain parts of the defendant's beliefs. Namely, Westen
tells the jury to disregard the defendant's personal views about what it is right to be
extremely angry about and substitute the judgment of the community as to that
question.
Westen proposes the following instruction:
The Defendant's Traits. To [determine whether the defendant's extreme anger
was reasonable], you shall start by taking the defendant as he is-with one
important exception that I'll discuss in a moment. That is, you shall consider
everything you know about the defendant-including every physical character
istic, every experience, every personal relationship to others, and every
emotional and temperamental disposition he may have.
The Defendant's Values. Nevertheless, there is one thing about the defendant
you shall not take into account. You shall not consider his own personal views,
or the particular views of his ethnic community, about what it is right to be
extremely angry about. Rather, you shall judge the reasonableness of his anger
by how angry you, as representatives of the people of the state, conclude an
individual who is otherwise like him is right to feel-or, at least, not wrong to
feel-in response to what actually upset him. 113

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 151.
Compare id.. with Nourse. supra note 17. at 1393-94 (similar idea).
Westen. supra note 8. at 151.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 158.
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The descriptions above show that Nourse's test and Westen's test are conceptu
ally distinct. 114 Both tests, however, share a fundamental similarity. Both allow the
provocation partial defense only in cases in which the broader political community
affirmatively shares or endorses the defendant's anger in response to the provoca
tion. Both Westen's test and Nourse's test fail, however, to adequately differentiate
the test cases stated in Part III. That is to say, neither test allows us to differentiate
between cases in which a defendant's personal or cultural beliefs do seem properly
relevant, and cases in which they do not.
Return to the Aboriginal Man. Under Westen's proposed jury instruction, the
jury cannot consider the fact that the Aboriginal culture (of which the defendant
and victim were both members) contains a strong taboo against "talking men's
talk." Westen's instruction explicitly tells the jury it may not consider the fact that
the Aboriginal culture believes it is right (or at least not wrong) to become
extremely angry in response to a violation of its taboo against "talking men's talk."
That is to say, the jury is prohibited from considering the belief in the taboo
because belief in the taboo and belief that violating the taboo is a good cause for
extreme anger are one in the same. Under this instruction, then, the Aboriginal
defendant will fail in his "provocation" claim, unless the jury is composed of
members of the same Aboriginal tribe and the jurors share the same belief in the
"talking men's talk" taboo.
Now, consider the White Supremacist. Westen's jury instruction, like in the case
of the Aboriginal Man, tells the jury that it cannot consider the defendant's beliefs
about what it is right to be angry about. For the White Supremacist, that means that
the jury cannot consider the fact that the defendant (and perhaps his sub-culture)
strongly believes that inter-racial romance is wrong, and that the defendant
believes that public displays of inter-racial affection are a good reason to become
extremely angry.
For the White Supremacist, that result aligns with our intuitions. We do not want
to judge this defendant from the point of view of someone who believes
inter-racial romance is wrongful. We prefer to judge him by the norms of the
community-which endorses norms of racial equality and non-discrimination.
But for the Aboriginal Man, the result seems perverse. It seems appropriate to
judge the defendant according to the norms of the community to which he and the
victim both belong, even though those norms may not be broadly shared by the
larger political community (or the jury representing that community).
Westen's instruction likewise fails to differentiate between the Conservative
Pakistani Father and the Devout Catholic. Westen's formulation rules out the heat

114. Nourse"s test asks if the cause for the defendant"s anger is one already recognized by the state as a crime;
Westen"s test does not require this. but instead asks more generally whether the community shares or endorses the
defendant" s anger.
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of passion defense in any case in which the defendant's reason for becoming angry
is one that is not broadly shared by the wider political community.
The flaw in Westen's proposed instruction is that it limits "reasonable provoca
tions" to provocations for which the broader community all agree form a good
reason to be extremely angry. But there are some cases, such as the Aboriginal Man
or the Devout Catholic, in which the broader community may not share the
defendant's outrage at the provocation, and yet many feel the defense should be
available. 115
Nourse's test suffers from the same flaw. Nourse asks whether the defendant
"respond[ed] with a rage shared by the law." 116 If so, the defendant is not simply
making "a claim for sympathy," but rather making "a claim of authority and a
demand for our concurrence." 117 The defendant "asks that we share his judgments
of emotional blame." 118
The Aboriginal Man loses under this test. The law of the jurisdiction does not
share-or reflect-his rage at a fellow Aboriginal tribesman who "talks men's
talk" in front of an uninitiated boy. Not only does Nourse require (like Westen) that
the community "share" the defendant's judgment "of emotional blame," but she
further requires that this judgment be reflected in the law. For a defendant like the
Aboriginal Man, whose anger derives from a deeply held cultural conviction (even
if it is a conviction shared by the victim), the provocation doctrine is not available.
The Devout Catholic is more complicated to evaluate under Nourse's test,
although ultimately this example illustrates an additional flaw in Nourse's stan
dard. Unlike the Aboriginal Man-who can point only to a violation of deeply held
cultural norms-the Devout Catholic can also point to a violation of the criminal
law. The Devout Catholic responds to a man who urinates on the altar of a Catholic
church and decapitates holy statues. Those acts---certainly the decapitation of the
holy statues-are property crimes. If the statues are very valuable, they may be
somewhat serious property crimes. Thus, the Devout Catholic might argue that his
anger is shared by the political community-a judgment reflected by the criminal
law's prohibition against damaging the property of another.
Yet, ultimately, the question remains whether the fact-finder should view the
desecrations of the sacred Catholic statues from the perspective of a Devout
Catholic, or from the perspective of a neutral "reasonable person." If the De
vout Catholic is fortunate enough to draw a jury composed predominantly of
devout Catholics, perhaps he will prevail even under a "generic" "reasonable
person" standard-those jurors may well embody the "reasonable person" with
their own views of sacredness. But this is just a fortuity. The Devout Catholic may
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See infra pp. 420-22 and notes 53-58.
Nourse. supra note 17. at 1393.
Id.
Id.
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likewise find himself before a jury (or judge) that does not place any particular
value on Catholic statuary.
Moreover, the deep offense that the Devout Catholic seeks to have the jury
recognize does not come primarily from the fact that the transgressor damaged
property, or that the criminal law punishes deliberate acts of property damage.
Would a reasonable person be provoked into extreme anger-the sort of anger that
makes it much more difficult to restrain an impulse to kill-by seeing a man
damage property in a public park? Probably not. The Devout Catholic's strongest
argument does not come from the fact that property was damaged-although that
is certainly relevant-but from the fact that the defendant deliberately chose to
desecrate (not merely damage) property held to be deeply sacred by the Devout
Catholic and his church.
Nourse would permit the jury to consider the criminal act of property damage as
a potentially sufficient provocation, but it does not appear under her test that the
jury should also consider the defendant's deliberate choice to lewdly desecrate a
sacred and holy object, which is precisely the reason this instance of property
damage is so enraging. The same is true for the Muslim Man assaulted by a pigskin
shoe.
Both Nourse and Westen require that the broader political community affirma
tively share or endorse the defendant's reason for becoming extremely angry.
Accordingly, both tests fail to accommodate defendants like the Aboriginal Man or
the Devout Catholic.
D. The "Oxymoron Principle" and the "Anti-Violence" Norm
Joshua Dressler has also directly addressed the problem of how much to
"subjectivize" or "individualize" the reasonable person in provocation cases. He
concedes that he is "unsure of precisely where ... to draw the lines in specific
cases," 119 but he offers two rules to distinguish these cases.
The first he labels the "oxymoron principle." 120 He explains that a jury should
not incorporate "an attribute or belief of the provoked actor that would force us to
describe the 'reasonable person' in near oxymoronic terms. One cannot be a
'reasonable paranoid,' for example." 121 Likewise there is no such thing as a
"reasonable white supremacist," so the jury should not be instructed to view the
sufficiency of the provocation from the perspective of a "reasonable white
supremacist." 122
Second, if a defendant argues provocation based on a cultural belief system not
shared by the broader culture, "we must decide if allowing him to explain his

119.
120.
121.
122.

Dressler. supra note 9. at 994.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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reason for his anger on the basis of a belief system foreign to the jury would violate
the anti-violence norms of the criminal law." 123 Dressler uses the example of the
Aboriginal Man, and concludes that his provocation claim should go to the jury. 124
The cultural belief motivating his extreme anger does not violate the anti-violence
norms of the criminal law-the cultural taboo against "talking men's talk" does not
seem to "suggest[] that Aboriginals value human life less than non-Aboriginals." 125
Dressler contrasts the Aboriginal Man with individuals who have moral norms
that do violate the criminal law's anti-violence norm: for example, an assassin who
believes killing others is not wrong. 126
The "oxymoron principle" functions as follows: by juxtaposing the particular
belief or attribute in question (say, homophobia) with the concept of the "reason
able person," Dressler prompts us to evaluate whether the particular belief or
attribute is itself "reasonable." Asking whether a "reasonable white supremacist"
is an oxymoron is a way of prompting us to evaluate the "reasonableness" of
believing in white supremacy.
This test is thus similar to the "blameworthy" test I articulate below, although
the "blameworthy" test makes explicit what is merely implied by Dressler's
"oxymoron" test. Dressler's "oxymoron" principle allows us to distinguish be
tween the Aboriginal Man and the White Supremacist. There is nothing oxymo
ronic about referring to a "reasonable Aboriginal man," but the concept of a
"reasonable white supremacist" is an oxymoron.
The "oxymoron" principle becomes more difficult to apply in the case of the
Conservative Pakistani Father, or the Adi Humaid case. Is it an oxymoron to refer
to a "reasonable Pakistani man"? Surely not. Is it an oxymoron to refer to a
"reasonable conservative Pakistani man"? Again, the answer seems to be no.
Perhaps the "oxymoron" test should be applied at a greater level of specificity: is it
an oxymoron to refer to a "reasonable conservative Pakistani man who believes
that daughters should submit to their father's choice of husbands"? Or consider R.
v. Humaid. Do we ask whether a "reasonable Muslim man" is an oxymoron? A
"reasonable Muslim man whose culture is extremely intolerant of female infidelity"?
These examples begin to show the shortcomings of the "oxymoron" test. It can
be difficult to ensure that the test is being applied at the right level of specificity, or
targeted to the appropriate attribute or belief. More fundamentally, the test
becomes awkward in some cases because it uses the concept of "oxymoron" to
approximate what is really going on: namely, evaluating whether the particular
belief or attribute in question is blameworthy.
Dressler's "oxymoron principle" functions by adopting a particular meaning of
the concept of "reasonableness," but he is not explicit about what "reasonableness"
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Id. at 996.
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Id. at 991-92.
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means. One view of what counts as "reasonable"-a view expressed by Nourse
and Westen-is whether the broader political community shares or endorses the
defendant's emotional response. If that is what Dressler means by "reasonable,"
then his view is similar to Nourse and Westen (and is flawed for the same reasons).
But Dressler does not appear to mean that, as he concludes that a "reasonable
Aboriginal man" is not an oxymoron. Thus, the Aboriginal Man-and, most
importantly, his cultural belief regarding the taboo against "talking men's talk"
can be viewed as "reasonable."
Accordingly, Dressler appears to be using the term "reasonable" in a particular
way. While he is not explicit, his examples are consistent with the meaning of
"reasonable" articulated here-that "reasonableness" relates to "blameworthi
ness." That is to say, a defendant's extreme emotional reaction is not "reasonable"
if that reaction is blameworthy-if it conflicts with the fundamental values of the
political community.
Dressler's second rule-the "anti-violence" principle-seems to simply be one
manifestation of the "oxymoron principle," and thus is an unnecessary addition.
Dressler invokes the "anti-violence" rule as a way to reject a provocation claim by
an assassin or terrorist who simply does not value human life appropriately. 127 But
the "oxymoron principle" is already sufficient to reject those claims. A defendant
who asks to be judged from the perspective of a "reasonable assassin" is pressing
an oxymoron, for an assassin-someone who kills without adequate justification
is unreasonable.
Accordingly, Dressler's "anti-violence" norm seems to be a subset of his
"oxymoron" principle. That "oxymoron" principle points in the right direction, yet
it merely implies what should be made explicit-the "blameworthiness" principle
explained below.
E. Reasonableness and "Switching"

Cynthia Lee agrees with the commentators above that jurors should ask not only
whether the defendant in fact became extremely angry, but "should also ask
whether the defendant's response ought to be recognized as reasonable." 128
Lee recognizes the difficulty posed by defendants with specific cultural or
religious beliefs, 129 as well as the problem of how to assess reasonableness given
different perspectives based on gender, race, and sexual orientation. 130 She agrees
that the law must make a normative assessment of reasonableness, not merely
assess descriptively whether "most people" would become angry in the situation. 131
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Id. at 209-12
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The remaining difficult question, of course, is how to articulate a standard or
guideline for the normative judgment jurors are asked to make-in Lee's terms,
how "[t]o give descriptive content to normative reasonableness." 132 Lee invokes
the concept of "switching" to enable jurors to appropriately conduct this normative
inquiry. 133
"Switching" (in this context) is the concept of asking jurors to "switch"
perspectives based on attributes such as gender, race, or sexual orientation. 134 Take
a stereotypical provocation case in which "the defendant is a man who claims he
was provoked into a heat of passion when he caught his female partner in an act of
infidelity." 135 When assessing the "reasonableness" of this provocation, jurors
might switch genders of the parties involved, asking "what the average woman
would do if she came home and found her male partner in bed with another
woman." 136
Lee contends that "[m]ost women in this situation would be upset, but few
would become so violent as to kill." 137 Thus switching gender perspectives might
help "jurors understand the unreasonableness of the male defendant's use of
deadly force." 138
Switching also could be used in cases involving race or sexual orientation. The
jurors might be instructed to consider a similar set of facts with the race or sexual
orientation of the parties changed. 139 This act of switching, Lee argues, can help
reveal hidden or unspoken bias and prejudice on the part of the jurors. 140 Lee
draws on social science evidence showing that when hidden biases become more
visible and salient, jurors actually are better able to recognize and overcome their
implicit biases. 141
Accordingly, Lee proposes
that judges instruct jurors that while it is completely normal to be
influenced by dominant social norms, including masculinity norms,

132. Id. at 252.
133. Id. at 217-25. 252-53.
134. Id. at 217-25.
135. Id. at 218.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 221-25. 252-53.
140. Id. at 217-25. 258-59 ("Role reversal through gender-. race-. and sexual orientation-switching is a useful
way of exposing bias and privilege. Switching helps expose the fact that heterosexual male violence is often
presumed reasonable when similar violence by heterosexual females. gay men. and men of color would not be
seen as reasonable.'"); Lee. supra note 8. at 564--66.
141. Lee. supra note 8. at 536 ("[R]esearch suggests that making race salient (i.e .. calling attention to race) can
help individuals to overcome what would otherwise be automatic stereotype-congruent responses. I argue that if
making race salient makes it easier for individuals to battle racial stereotypes. then making sexual orientation
salient may similarly make it easier for individuals to battle sexual orientation bias.'"); LEE. supra note 9. at 259
("Switching is ... likely to spark debate and discussion in the jury room about whether violence in response to
female infidelity. gay panic. or racialized fear ought to be considered reasonable.'').
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heterosexuality norms, and race norms, they should try not to let such
norms bias their decision making. If they are uncertain as to whether
such norms have influenced them, jurors may engage in gender-, race-,
and/or sexual orientation-switching. 142
While this technique is promising, Lee recognizes the potential pitfalls of using
"switching" as a general technique. She states, for example, that gender-switching
is not "appropriate in all cases." 143 For a "battered woman who kills her abuser
during a confrontation," gender-switching would ask the jury to consider whether
the man-who may be larger and physically stronger-would have responded
similarly to abuse from a woman. 144
Likewise Lee argues that race-switching would be inappropriate in a case in
which the defendant, a black man, killed in response to a grave racial insult. 145 In
that context, Lee argues that the jury should be educated on the history of
discrimination-and the role of the "N-word"-in denigrating black persons in
America. 146 It makes no sense to consider this insult from the perspective of a
white person, as this insult does not denigrate white persons. 147 "Even if jurors
were to do more than simply switch the races of the parties, such as replacing the
N word with the word 'honky,' race-switching might still be inappropriate"
because whites do not have the same history of racism, and racial slurs, as
blacks. 148
Lee's comments thus show that while "switching" can provide a useful tool for
unearthing and hopefully defusing implicit bias, the practice does not actually
identify the fundamental normative judgment to be made. To determine when
switching is appropriate, the criminal justice system needs some standard against
which to evaluate the appropriateness, or inappropriateness, of the defendant's
emotional response.
V.

REASONABLE PROVOCATION AND BLAMEWORTHY REASONS TO BE ANGRY

The proposals set forth above either fail to adequately distinguish our model
cases, or fail to provide convincing conceptual accounts. There is general agree
ment that assessing the "reasonableness" or "sufficiency" of provocation involves
a normative assessment of the defendant's emotional reaction, but no agreement on
the exact nature of that normative assessment. 149
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A. Normative Evaluation of Emotional Response: Blameworthy Anger

Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum articulate and defend an "evaluative concep
tion" of emotion. 150 The blameworthiness principle described in this article is just
that-a normative evaluation of a defendant's emotional response.
Kahan and Nussbaum's evaluative conception holds that emotions themselves
are not merely mechanistic, automated responses to stimuli. 151 Instead, "emotions
contain not only thought, but thought of a particular sort, namely appraisal or
evaluation." 152 Because emotions themselves express appraisal or evaluations,
emotions can in turn be properly subject to normative assessment or evaluation. 153
Some emotional responses are normatively appropriate or laudable; others are
inappropriate or blameworthy.
In the context of the provocation doctrine, Kahan and Nussbaum explain how an
evaluative conception of emotion helps illustrate the proper functioning of the
doctrine:
There must be provocation because it is only in response to significant slights
that anger or rage is morally appropriate. And mitigation is warranted only
when the angry person attacks her provoker because it is that person's conduct
that forms the proper object of the evaluation embodied in anger. These
features of the doctrine prevent mitigation in circumstances in which the
actor's passion, however intense, reflects inappropriate valuations. 154

An appropriate test for provocation thus will involve a normative evaluation of
the defendant's extreme anger. Moreover, identifying the correct type of normative
evaluation helps solve the dilemma of cultural claims.
The correct standard is that provocation is not "adequate" or "sufficient" if the
defendant's reason for becoming extremely angry is itself blameworthy. This
standard does not ask if the broader community endorses or shares the defendant's
reason for becoming extremely angry. In cases like the Aboriginal Man, the
Devout Catholic, or the Muslim Man assaulted by the pigskin shoe, the broader
political community may not share or affirmatively endorse those reasons or
values. Instead, this standard asks whether the broader political community
condemns or affirmatively rejects the defendant's reason for becoming extremely
angry-that is, whether the reason for becoming extremely angry is blameworthy.
The heat of passion doctrine recognizes that persons in a state of passion-such
as extreme anger-have substantially less control over their actions, and thus they
are less blameworthy (or culpable) for acting rashly than a person who does so
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while in full control of their emotions. At the same time, some persons in a state of
extreme anger are themselves to blame for being in that state. Those persons are
excluded from claims of reduced culpability precisely because they are to blame
for placing themselves in a state of reduced control, and thus cannot ask our
sympathy when they act rashly in that condition.
B. Blameworthy Anger-Distinguishing Disputed Cases

An example of a proper jury instruction for the "reasonable provocation"
component of the provocation doctrine is the following:
Reasonableness ofAnger.
You must determine whether it was reasonable for the defendant to become
extremely angry. To determine this, you must begin by looking at things from
the defendant's perspective, taking into account everything you know about
the defendant-including every physical characteristic, experience, character
trait, and cultural, religious, or personal belief.
A defendant's extreme anger is not "reasonable" if it is based on some
blameworthy belief, attitude, or trait. The reason is blameworthy if it conflicts
with the fundamental values of our nation. You must determine whether the
reason that the defendant became extremely angry is a blameworthy reason.
If you determine that the defendant's extreme anger does not come from
some blameworthy belief, attitude, or trait, then you shall determine whether it
was reasonable for a person in the defendant's position to become extremely
angry.
If you determine that the defendant's extreme anger came partly from a
blameworthy reason (or reasons), and partly from a reason (or reasons) that is
not blameworthy, then you shall ignore the blameworthy reason(s) and focus
only on the reasons that are not blameworthy. Considering only the non
blameworthy reasons, you shall determine whether, in light of those reasons, it
was reasonable for a person in the defendant's position to become extremely
angry.

This standard allows us to distinguish between the cases set forth in Part III. It
does so by identifying the reason why considering the defendant's beliefs in cases
such as the Aboriginal Man and the Devout Catholic seems appropriate, whereas
considering the defendant's beliefs in cases such as the White Supremacist and the
Conservative Pakistani Father seems inappropriate.
The White Supremacist defendant becomes extremely angry at seeing an
inter-racial couple kissing in public. This defendant's extreme anger is properly
blameworthy, as his anger does not manifest appropriate respect on his part for the
interests of others. This is true even knowing that the defendant is a member (since
childhood) of the Aryan Nation, and that his community has a shared commit
ment to white supremacy. The white supremacist beliefs promulgated by the
Aryan Nation do not manifest appropriate respect for the interests of others
such as African-Americans (among others)-and thus the Aryan Nation
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adherent's conduct in becoming extremely angry due to a violation of those
beliefs is blameworthy.
Contrast this with the Aboriginal Man. Even though a non-Aboriginal person
would not share the Aborigine's beliefs about "talking men's talk," a non
Aborigine might still be able to come to the conclusion that given everything we
know about the Aboriginal defendant, his extreme anger at seeing another member
of his tribe "talking men's talk" in front of uninitiated boys is not blameworthy.
The Aboriginal Man's emotional response does not fail to manifest appropriate
respect for the interests of others, even though the broader political community
does not share his reasons for becoming angry.
Now consider the Devout Catholic. The Devout Catholic's belief that the church
altar and the statues inside the church are holy and sacred is not necessarily a view
shared or endorsed by the broader political community and is not a value
affirmatively protected by state law. 155 At the same time, the Devout Catholic's
belief in the sacredness of a statue of the Virgin Mary is not blameworthy or
properly an object of condemnation. It does not manifest inappropriate respect for
the interests of others. Accordingly, a jury evaluating the sufficiency of the
provocation should consider the Devout Catholic's views that the church altar and
statues were sacred and holy, even if the jurors themselves do not share those
views.
This test does not dictate the outcome of each particular case. The jury must still
determine whether it was "reasonable" for a Devout Catholic holding those views
to become enraged at the sight of the desecration. If the case were extreme-such
as the depiction in Roberto Bolafio's novel 2666, in which a man known as "the
Penitent" repeatedly urinates and defecates on Catholic church alters and decapi
tates many statutes, and also assaults priests-a jury might conclude that the
provocation was sufficient and the Devout Catholic's extreme anger was reason
able. In contrast, if the Devout Catholic killed in a rage after seeing a tourist
inadvertently sneeze on a holy statute, the jury would likely conclude that the
provocation was not sufficient and the Devout Catholic's extreme anger was not
reasonable. In any event, the "blameworthiness" standard properly frames the
issue for the jury to make a judgment.
The Conservative Pakistani Father, like the Devout Catholic, relies on a mix of
cultural and religious views. The Conservative Pakistani Father might believe (and
might locate these beliefs in his cultural and religious community) that women

155. In some areas. such as heavily Catholic or Christian communities. these attributions of sacredness might
indeed by broadly shared. In other areas they may not be. In either case. the sacredness of a religious shrine is not
protected (as sacred) by state law. For example. a private citizen could construct or purchase a shrine to the Virgin
Mary. and then treat that shrine disrespectfully-destroy it. or otherwise desecrate it. This conduct is not criminal.
and indeed is a protected form of free speech. See Victor A. Kovner et al.. NYC Mayor Giuliani Loses Round One
in Battle Against the First Amendment. 17 COMM. LAW. 3. 3 (2000) (discussing the "preliminary injunction against
the city and the mayor. thereby bringing a temporary halt to their efforts to punish the Brooklyn Museum for
displaying art that the mayor had declared 'disgusting• and offensive to Roman Catholics"").
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should generally be submissive to men and that daughters should submit to the will
of their fathers. The Conservative Pakistani Father is permitted to hold these
beliefs. But the Conservative Pakistani Father's beliefs nonetheless run contrary to
the state's commitment to sex and gender equality. It is blameworthy to become
extremely angry in response to a daughter choosing to follow her own life path
rather than submit to her father's will. Thus, a jury should reject the Conservative
Pakistani Father's provocation claim. It might be true that he killed in a state of
extreme anger, which made it much more difficult for him to control his conduct,
and thereby renders him less culpable or blameworthy for his actions. But he is to
blame for the reason he entered into that state of extreme rage in the first place, so
he loses his claim to the jury's sympathy.
A similar analysis applies in R. v. Humaid, in which the defendant who killed his
wife based on a suggestion of possible infidelity called an expert who "described
Islamic culture as male dominated, preoccupied with the concept of 'family
honour,' and particularly intolerant of female infidelity." 156 As the court explained,
the problem in allowing Humaid to present this argument "is that the alleged
beliefs which give the insult added gravity are premised on the notion that women
are inferior to men and that violence against women is in some circumstances
accepted, if not encouraged," and those beliefs "are antithetical to fundamental
Canadian values, including gender equality." 157
It is useful to contrast Humaid with the case of a Muslim man assaulted by a
pigskin shoe. In each case, the defendant seeks to draw on particular religious and
cultural sensitivities not shared by the broader political community, which greatly
exaggerated the gravity of the provocation. For the man assaulted with the pigskin
shoe, the religious and cultural taboo on products from pigs is not blameworthy,
and thus can form a proper basis for his provocation claim. For Humaid, however,
his extreme sensitivity to female marital infidelity, grounded in (claimed) religious
and cultural beliefs, violates the political community's fundamental values-a
commitment to gender equality. Thus, his provocation claim cannot properly be
based on that blameworthy motivation.
C. Blameworthy Anger-Conceptual Foundations

The conceptual foundation of this "blameworthiness" test rests on the underly
ing justification for punishment in the criminal law-a normative judgment of
moral blameworthiness. A defendant whose anger is an appropriate response to a
provocation is not to blame for that anger. 158 This standard incorporates the
insights of a number of commentators who likewise argue that the law must
normatively evaluate the defendant's emotional response.

156. Way. supra note 52. at 7.
157. R v. Humaid. [2006] 81 O.R. 3d 456. 480 para. 93 (Can. Ont. C.A.); see also Way. supra note 52. at 11.
158. See Kahan & Nussbaum. supra note 22. at 306--07.
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As Peter Westen explains, courts should not attempt to "incorporate" select traits
or beliefs of the defendant onto an abstract "reasonable person." 159 Instead, courts
should focus on the underlying reason we punish an individual in the criminal law.
Courts should begin with the actual defendant and apply the appropriate moral
filter to evaluate that particular defendant's reaction. 160 According to Westen, the
legal system must determine whether the defendant's was "motivated in his
conduct by proper regard for interests that the law seeks to safeguard," or whether
the defendant "placed insufficient value on those interests." 161
But rather than insist that the political community affirmatively share or endorse
the defendant's anger, as Nourse and Westen do, the law should ask the more
modest question of whether the community must affirmatively reject the defen
dant's anger-whether the reason for becoming angry is blameworthy. This allows
the state to accommodate some degree of cultural and religious pluralism, while
still articulating and protecting the core moral commitments of the broader
political community.
Along similar lines, Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg note that "[w]hen one
is wronged ... anger may be the appropriate response." 162 This "appropriate
anger" fits within the provocation doctrine as follows: "When one is angry, one's
moral sense should serve only as ... a bridle to the passions .... If the self
restraint fails, then one's moral inhibitions have not functioned as they should, and
that hardly makes one any less to blame." 163
In contrast, as von Hirsch and Jareborg state, in cases in which a defendant has
been "wronged" and thus "is properly angry," the moral sense plays a different
role. 164 "Far from having a purely suppressing role, one's sense of right and wrong
is part of what prompts and gives legitimacy to the anger." 165 The defendant is less
to blame "because the actor was moved to transgress in part because of, rather than
despite, his sense ofright and wrong." 166
The defendant's ability to claim provocation thus rests in part on whether "there
should be good reason for the actor's sense of injury or affront. When the actor has
taken affront without just cause, then his sense of values is merely deficient." 167 In
contrast, "[i]t is where an actor both should feel angry and yet must try to control
that justifiable anger that he or she becomes less to blame for overstepping the

159. Westen. supra note 8. at 140. 148.
160. Id. at 140; see also Kahan & Nussbaum. supra note 22. at 306--07. 313-15 (making a similar claim under
the rubric of an "evaluative conception'' of emotion).
161. Westen, supra note 8, at 151.
162. Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Provocation and Culpability, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND
THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 241, 249 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1988).
163. Id. at 250.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 251.
167. Id.
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bounds." 168
Kahan and Nussbaum make similar points, using their "evaluative conception"
of emotion. 169 They state that the provocation doctrine should be available only
when the defendant's "anger or rage is morally appropriate." 170 In contrast, the
partial defense should not be available "in circumstances in which the actor's
passion, however intense, reflects inappropriate valuations." 171 The provocation
doctrine thus "condemn[s] acts that reflect at least some appropriate emotional
motivations less severely than acts that reflect only inappropriate emotional
motivations." 172
None of these commentators, however, take the further step of explaining how
to judge a defendant whose moral sense is motivated by a reason that the broader
political community might not share. In cases like the Aboriginal Man as well as
the White Supremacist, the defendant "was moved to transgress in part because of,
rather than despite, his sense of right and wrong." 173 Yet the question remains
whether that sense of right or wrong is correctly calibrated-whether "the actor's
animus testifies to the soundness" or to the "deficiency ... of his moral
judgment." 174
It is here that the "blameworthiness" standard helps clarify the judgment to be
made. In the case of the Aboriginal Man, his extreme anger does not represent a
"deficiency" in his moral judgment, because it is not blameworthy-even though it
is not a moral judgment shared by the community. In the case of the White
Supremacist, his moral judgment is "deficient" and thus his animus testifies to the
blameworthiness of his moral judgment, not its soundness.
Westen proposes that blameworthiness be assessed by asking whether the
defendant's "extreme emotional agitation ... manifest[s] appropriate respect on
his part for the interests of others?" 175 Westen mistakenly assumes that a defen
dant's extreme emotional agitation manifests appropriate respect for the interests
of others only when the broader political community shares or affirmatively
endorses the defendant's reason for becoming extremely angry. 176 But that is not
the case. A defendant does not reveal himself to be blameworthy merely because
the broader political community does not share his reasons for becoming ex
tremely angry. A defendant can show appropriate respect for the interests of others

168. Id.
169. Kahan & Nussbaum. supra note 22. at 306-15.
170. Id. at 306-07.
171. Id. at 307.
172. Id. at 313.
173. von Hirsch & Jareborg. supra note 162. at 251.
174. Id.; see also Kahan & Nussbaum. supra note 22. at 313 (asking whether the defendant acted with
"appropriate emotional motivations'' or "inappropriate emotional motivations," without identifying a standard for
making that judgment in contested cases).
175. Id. at 140.
176. Id.
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even when the broader political community does not share or endorse the
defendant's views. For example, an observant Muslim person or Jewish person
who politely declines a host's offer of pork is not being rude, even if the host (like
the broader political community) does not believe that pork is taboo.
Rather, a defendant reveals himself to be blameworthy when he is motivated by
reasons that the broader political community condemns or affirmatively rejects.
D. Judging Emotion-A Role of the Liberal State?
Some may object to the idea of assessing the "blameworthiness" of a defen
dant's reasons for becoming angry, on the grounds that it seems problematic for the
state to make a moral judgment about which types of personal motivations are
"blameworthy" and which are not. In general, the proper function of the liberal
state is to adjudicate harms inflicted by one individual against another, but not to
engage in free-standing assessment (let alone punishment) of the blameworthiness
of personal views held by individuals within the community. 177 Foundational
liberal principles such as freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of
conscience all presuppose the freedom of individuals within the broad political
community to hold personal views at odds with others in the community, at odds
with the majority, and at odds with the "official" views of the state. 178
Kahan and Nussbaum recognize (and then reject) this objection. Under their
"evaluative conception" of emotion, the state "appraises the evaluations internal to
the offender's emotions as reasonable or not reasonable," and in doing so:
takes a whole range of moral stands-about the importance of the murder of a
child, about the (alleged) difference between the killing of an unfaithful wife's
lover and the killing of an unfaithful girlfriend's lover, about the appropriate
ness or inappropriateness of the disgust occasioned by witnessing a homo
sexual act. 179

They note that some might "think that it is improper for the law to get involved
in such judgments at all in a liberal democratic society." 180 In a liberal state,
individuals

177. JOHN STUART MILL. ON LIBERTY 68 (Penguin Books 1974) (1859) ("[T]he only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community. against his will. is to prevent harm to
others. His own good. either physical or moral. is not a sufficient warrant.'").
178. See Everson v. Bd. of Ed.. 330 U.S. 1. 15-16 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion• clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government ... can force nor influence a
person ... to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs.'"); Frazier v. Alexandre. 555 F.3d 1292. 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Whether one
calls it 'the right not to speak" or 'liberty of conscience.• the freedom to think and hold beliefs that do not comport
with state orthodoxy is a basic part of this nation"s foundation ... .'").
179. Kahan & Nussbaum. supra note 22. at 359.
180. Id.
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should be free to live their lives by their own conceptions of the good, deciding
how much importance to accord to children, how much respect to the moral or
religious standards that give rise to disgust at homosexual conduct, and so
forth. Surely the law should be studiously neutral among competing concep
tions of the good. 181

Kahan and Nussbaum recognize that this normative judgment is both proper and
inescapable. If the law chooses not to evaluate which types of anger are norma
tively blameworthy and which are not, then it is left to simply assess whether the
defendant was in fact extremely angry (what Kahan and Nussbaum call the
"mechanistic" conception of emotion). 182 Under that approach-refusing to norma
tively assess the defendant's anger-the law effectively concludes:
that getting angry over the murder of one's own child and getting angry over
the sight of two same-sex strangers making love differ in no salient way, that
the only thing worth attending to here is the strength of the offender's anger,
which might, of course, happen to be equally great in the two cases. 183

By attempting to be "neutral" among differing conceptions of the good, the law
would fail to reflect our intuitions and would "disregard what deeply rooted norms
of reasonableness make central." 184
In a provocation case, the state is not prosecuting an individual for "blamewor
thy" beliefs as such. Rather, the state prosecutes the individual for committing
murder-intentionally killing another person, without justification. In response,
the defendant seeks to mitigate his culpability for that wrongful killing. He does so
by highlighting the fact that it was substantially more difficult for him to resist the
urge to kill than is ordinarily the case, because he was in a state of extreme
emotional disturbance. Due to that state, he pleads, he is substantially less culpable
than one who intentionally kills in an ordinary state.
Yet the heat of passion doctrine implicitly recognizes that ordinarily, the act of
becoming extremely angry is itself a blameworthy act. While it may be true that
one who is extremely angry is less able to control his impulses, it is often true that
the person is more culpable for being in a state of extreme anger. It is precisely this
"loss of impulse control" feature of extreme anger--on which the defendant relies
to plead mitigation-that makes it blameworthy to allow oneself to become
extremely angry.
Even so, the heat of passion doctrine recognizes that there are some circum
stances in which it is not unreasonable to become extremely angry-where the law
should not expect what it ordinarily expects, namely that persons will refrain from
entering that highly risky state of extreme anger (or at least, that they will retain

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id.
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control over their violent impulses while in such a state). In fact, there are some
cases in which "anger may be the appropriate response" to being wronged. 185
In evaluating the defendant's reason for becoming extremely angry, the state is
thus in the somewhat unique position of considering the defendant's plea that it
was appropriate-or at least, not blameworthy-for him to become extremely
angry in the circumstances. In this context, the objections stated above-about
freedom of conscience and the proper role of the liberal state-lose much of their
force. Rather than punishing people for unpopular thoughts, the state in a
provocation claim is punishing the defendant for a wrongful killing. The state is
willing to mitigate the defendant's crime as a concession to human weakness, 186
but not if the defendant's act of becoming extremely angry is itself blameworthy. If
that is the case, the defendant has no proper claim on our sympathies.
Stephen Garvey argues that proposals to assess the moral rightness of the
defendant's anger in voluntary manslaughter cases (this article's blameworthiness
standard is one such proposal) are fundamentally illiberal.
[l]f an actor finds himself saddled with an illiberal character, one composed of
illiberal beliefs and desires, and if he should be unlucky enough to lose
self-control and reveal, though not accept, his character's true colors in an
otherwise criminal act, punishing him for having such a character is an illiberal
use of state power. 187

Garvey notes, "[t]he point here is not that a liberal state cannot hold its citizens
in any way responsible for the content of their characters." 188 A liberal state is free
to "educate its citizens in the ways of a liberal order" as well as "criticize and
censure its illiberal citizens for their illiberal characters." 189 But the liberal state
"cannot legitimately ... heap more punishment on a citizen who, in the course of
violating the criminal law, happens also to reveal the illiberal state of his soul." 190
Moreover, to the extent that
one's beliefs are constituent elements of one's character over which one has no
direct or immediate control, then the additional punishment imposed on the
inadequately provoked actor, who neither accepts nor otherwise identifies with
the offending belief, is punishment imposed for the content of his character,
not for the character of his action. 191

185. von Hirsch & Jareborg. supra note 162. at 249.
186. Joshua Dressler. When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law,
SexualAdvances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard. 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726. 747 (1995) (citations
omitted).
187. Stephen P. Garvey. Passion's Puzzle, 90 IowAL. REv. 1677, 1716 (2005).
188. Id. at 1717.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1711.
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Garvey's objection is unfounded. By denying the provocation partial defense to
a defendant with blameworthy attributes or beliefs, the state is not punishing the
person for those beliefs as such. Rather, the state is denying a mitigating partial
defense to a person who has allowed those illiberal beliefs to motivate a violent
outburst.
A person with a blameworthy character trait or belief is in possession of a latent
risk-in a sense, this person is carrying around a bomb that might be triggered
without warning and harm others. Consider a person with an extremely volatile
temper. The standard metaphorical description of this person-they have a "short
fuse"-maps precisely onto this "bomb" metaphor.
The "short fuse" metaphor suggests the following: For an ordinary person (not
someone with a "short fuse"), an affront might ignite their "fuse," leading toward
an eventual explosion. Because the fuse is not "short," this person has time to
reflect on the affront, gain control of themselves, realize that the law prohibits
them from reacting with violence, and seek vindication through other lawful
mechanisms. This person has the time, given the length of their fuse, to snuff the
flame and stop the explosion of violence.
For a person with a "short fuse," this opportunity for reflection and self-restraint
is vanishingly short. After the affront ignites the fuse, the bomb of violence quickly
explodes, before the cooler and more rational parts of the person's character have
an opportunity to snuff the flame.
Focusing only on that moment, it seems improper to punish someone who
explodes with violence due to their short fuse. If as Garvey posits, our characters
are largely or perhaps entirely outside of our control, 192 then it seems improper to
punish the man with a short fuse.
From a broader view, however, it is apparent that there is still adequate
justification for blame. The man who has a (metaphorical) "short fuse" is like a
person carrying around an explosive that can readily be triggered. Generally
speaking, when persons transport explosives, our society imposes special obliga
tions of care. For example, a trucking company transporting volatile chemicals is
required to assume special burdens of care not required of those hauling an
ordinary load. 193 The volatile chemical transporter might be required to use a
specialized (and more expensive) trailer that minimizes the chance of explosion, to
display special signs warning others of the risks, to take special precautions in
areas with increased risks of explosion (such as a gas station), and to avoid entirely
certain areas with increased risks (for example tunnels). 194

192. Id.
193. See, e.g .. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975. Pub. L. 93-633. 88 Stat. 2156 ( 1975) (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-28 (2012)).
194. See Shippers-General Requirements for Shipments and Packagings. Hazardous Materials Regulations.
49 C.F.R. Part 173 (2017).
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So too with our short-fused man. We might reasonably expect this person, so far
as possible, to cultivate habits of patience and self-control. We might reasonably
expect him to avoid situations in which he knows his short fuse is particularly
likely to be lit: drinking at rowdy bars, or hanging around his ex-girlfriend who
often taunts him. We might expect him to seek assistance from his friends and
family for help in controlling his short fuse, including intervening if necessary
when he is getting angry.
Accordingly, it is just to punish the short-fused man as a murderer-to deny him
the partial defense of provocation-when he flies into a rage and purposely kills in
response to a provocation that would not similarly enrage a reasonable (not
short-fused) person. The short-fused man is not being punished for having a short
fuse. He is being denied a mitigating defense for failing to be aware of the
considerable risk his character posed to others-the short-fused bomb he was
carrying around-or, if he was aware of it, failing to take the necessary special
precautions to prevent his short-fused bomb from exploding and killing an
innocent person.
Now turn to a person with a blameworthy belief (or in Garvey's term, an illiberal
belief), such as a white supremacist vehemently opposed to inter-racial romance.
This person is free, in a liberal state, to hold this repugnant view. He has some
degree of freedom to make his own life choices according to that repugnant
view-avoiding intimate partners of other races, and urging his friends and family
to do likewise. At the same time, he must understand that his views run contrary to
the fundamental values of the state and polity in which he lives. His freedom to
live according to his white supremacist views has limits imposed by the state,
based on the impacts those beliefs may have on others. If he is an employer or rents
out housing to the public, for example, he is prohibited from acting on his white
supremacist beliefs in hiring or choosing renters. 195
Moreover, the white supremacist-like the short-fused man-must understand
that, in a sense, he carries around with him an explosive device. He is liable to
become extremely angry under certain circumstances in which, he must under
stand, he will receive no sympathy from the state. He knows that attending a public
park may well expose him to the sight of inter-racial couples showing affection. He
is free, in the liberal state, to harbor his hatred of this sight. He even can vent
verbally, casting offensive aspersions on the couple, so long as his verbal
comments do not constitute prohibited threats or harassment.
However, he must take great care-if he wishes to avoid the sanction of the
criminal law-that his illiberal beliefs do not manifest themselves in action, even
in a fit of anger. Garvey notes that if such a person purposefully channels his
illiberal beliefs into criminal action-such as going to a park looking for a black

195. See Civil Rights Act of 1964. tit. 7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l to -17 (2012).
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man to assault-he can properly be punished for a hate crime. 196 He concedes that
this is not a punishment of the illiberal belief as such, but a punishment for
channeling that belief into violent, criminal action. 197
A similar claim can be made in the provocation context. The white supremacist
must take care that his illiberal beliefs-the sensitive explosives he has chosen to
carry around with him-do not become momentarily enfiamed by some provoca
tion (an inter-racial couple kissing in the park) in a way that causes him to "lose
control" and kill.
It is appropriate for the liberal state to place this special obligation of self
control on him, vis-a-vis his blameworthy or illiberal beliefs. It is appropriate for
the liberal state to deny his plea for mitigation when he succumbs to the great anger
arising suddenly from the illiberal bomb (his white supremacist beliefs) he has
chosen to carry around.
Viewed in this way, the state is not punishing the white supremacist for his white
supremacist beliefs as such, just as it does not do so in a hate crimes prosecution.
Rather, in both cases the state punishes the white supremacist for channeling his
illiberal beliefs into criminal action. In the case of a hate crime, he channels that
belief into action deliberately and purposefully. In the case of the provocation
doctrine, he fails to maintain adequate safeguard so that his illiberal beliefs do not
trigger the extreme anger for which he should know the state will offer him no
sympathy.
Persons with (partly) illiberal characters have an obligation to take care that
their illiberal views-views they are free to hold, but which they understand
contravene the core values of the state in which they reside-are not channeled
into violent outbursts. If that occurs, they cannot properly expect mitigating
sympathy from the state, notwithstanding the sincerity of their anger and their
genuine reduction in self-control.
As noted at the outset, substantial operational questions remain as to whether the
legislature, the judge, the jury, or some combination of those institutions, is best
suited to determine which types of motivations are "blameworthy" and which are
not. Cynthia Lee argues at length that juries should be allowed to make these
normative determinations, albeit with instructions from the judge not to rely on
sexism, racism, homophobia, transphobia, or similar disfavored reasons. 198 I do
not purport to resolve these important operational concerns here. My focus,
instead, is on identifying and articulating the correct normative standard, regard
less of which legal institution implements and applies that standard.

196. Garvey. supra note 187. at 1711-13.
197. Id. at 1713.
198. See LEE. supra note 9. at 217-25. 252-53. 258-59; Lee. supra note 8. at 536. 564--66; Lee & Kwan. supra
note 20. at 119-32; see also Dressler. supra note 9. at 1001.
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"GAY PANIC," "TRANS PANIC," AND POSSESSIVE MEN KILLING INDEPENDENT
WOMEN

Defendants seek a provocation jury instruction in several recurring-and highly
controversial-contexts: men killing their intimate female partners out of claimed
jealousy, men killing other men in response to an unwanted sexual advance
(so-called "gay panic" cases), and men killing a trans woman upon discovering
that she is biologically male (so-called "trans panic" cases). These defendants want
the jury to consider the claimed provocation from the defendant's point of view. In
each of these contexts, commentators have criticized the provocation doctrine for
enabling or excusing sexism, homophobia, and transphobia. 199 Some have gone so
far as to call for the provocation doctrine to be abolished due to these concerns. 200
Other commentators, including many who share these concerns, nonetheless
defend the provocation doctrine and seek to retain it in at least some cases. 201
The "blameworthiness" principle articulated above provides the correct norma
tive framework for mediating these disputes. At a deep level, provocation claims in
these contexts share a fundamental similarity with provocation claims based on
minority cultural or religious views. Whether the defendant comes from our own
culture (or a sub-culture within it), or from a wholly foreign culture, the basic
challenge is the same: should the jury view the sufficiency of the provocation from
the defendant's perspective, or should the jury hold the defendant to some
objective standard?
The possessive man who kills his wife when she attempts to leave him does not
necessarily belong to an identifiable "cultural minority" (although he might). This
defendant is asking the jury to view the reasonableness of the provocation from
"his perspective" -a perspective internal to his view of the world. 202
Cynthia Lee has argued throughout her work on the provocation doctrine
that contested normative judgments, such as those involving issues of race, gender,
and sexual orientation, should be brought to the forefront and made salient to
jurors, rather than being permitted to silently or subconsciously influence
decision-making. 203

199. See infra notes 204. 269. 275. and 285.
200. See, e.g.. JEREMY HORDER. PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 193-97 (1992).
201. See, e.g .. LEE. supra note 9. at 203-75; Dressler. supra note 9. at 994-95; Nourse. supra note 17. at 1389
("My proposal seeks to reconstruct. rather than abolish. the defense.'").
202. See LEE. supra note 9. at 110-11 ("Contrary to popular perception. immigrant and racial minority
defendants are not the only ones who try to mitigate their criminal charges by relying on cultural norms. Every
time a White heterosexual male murder defendant argues he was reasonably provoked into a heat of passion by his
female partner"s infidelity or by a gay man"s sexual advance. he seeks to mitigate his charges by relying on
cultural norms.'") (emphasis added); Ben-David. supra note 9. at 10 ("One of the criticisms made against
recognizing cultural arguments as part of the provocation doctrine is that it improves the situation of men who
killed their spouses out of jealousy.'").
203. See LEE. supra note 9. at 203-75; Lee. supra note 8.
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The "blameworthiness" principle dovetails with Lee's approach, by helping
articulate for jurors (or other decision-makers) the nature of the normative
judgment to be made. In some provocation cases, jurors may feel conflicting
intuitions about whether a given defendant encountered a provocation that was
"adequate" or "sufficient," because some of the defendant's reasons for becoming
extremely angry were appropriate-not blameworthy-while other parts of the
defendant's reasons were blameworthy. The "blameworthiness" principle helps
judges, lawyers, and jurors think clearly about these contested normative issues, by
framing the correct standard against which to judge individual defendants.
A. "Blameworthiness" and the Feminist Critique of Provocation

Feminist scholars have criticized provocation law as a doctrine that primarily
benefits men, reinforces cultural stereotypes of masculinity and gender hierarchy,
and wrongly mitigates punishment for men who are highly violent and pose a
serious risk of danger to women in the future. 204 At the same time, many
commentators, including some of these feminist critics, believe that the provoca
tion doctrine (properly understood) serves important values and should not be
abolished. 205
In the traditional legal imagination, a paradigmatic heat of passion case involves
sexual infidelity: a man discovering his wife in the act of having sex with another
man and killing either the wife or the other man (or both). 206 Victoria Nourse's
research revealed that "the conventional image of passionate homicide-sexual
betrayal, love triangles, sordid affairs-represents a flawed view." 207 In many
cases, possessive men kill intimate partners not due to sexual infidelity, but rather
in the context of the woman leaving (or attempting to leave) the relationship. 208
Donna Coker has likewise questioned the traditional assumptions surrounding
violent male responses to female infidelity-or, perhaps, female independence.
Coker first questions "the belief that violence in response to a wife's provoca
tion-in this context, the wife's adulterous conduct-is an uncontrollable re
sponse, which in turn reinforces the belief that intervention can have little

204. See, e.g.. HORDER. supra note 200 (arguing that the doctrine should be abolished because it is biased
toward men who kill women); LEE. supra note 9. at 20--33; Coker. supra note 18. at 75-76; Mahoney. supra note
18; Elizabeth Rapaport. Comment. Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital Domestic
Murder in the Post- Furman Era. 49 SMU L. REv. 1507. 1546 (1996); Laurie J. Taylor. Provoked Reason in Men
and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and lmpeifect Self-Defense. 33 UCLA L. REv. 1679 ( 1986).
205. See, e.g.. supra note 201.
206. See LEE. supra note 9. at 17-25.
207. Nourse. supra note 17. at 1344.
208. Id. at 1343-58; see also Coker. supra note 18. at 76 (criticizing the legal system for failing to recognize
that abusive men who kill their intimate partners are often not acting in an uncontrolled. provoked heat of passion.
but in a predictable pattern of escalating violence that is likely to recur); Mahoney. supra note 18. at 78-79
(arguing that the law often improperly casts acts of separation by women as acts of infidelity or provocation).
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deterrence or prevention impact." 209 She argues instead that many men who kill
their intimate partners have a long history of violence against women, and thus
their act of killing is less an uncontrollable emotional response, and more of a
predictable manifestation of a grave character flaw-a disregard for women's
rights and interests.2 10
Relatedly, Coker questions the notion that "the wife-killer who kills in response
to his wife's 'provocative' conduct is seen as an unlikely recidivist and therefore
less dangerous." 211 Coker argues that in many cases, the defendant's history shows
he is generally violent toward women and does indeed pose a serious and
predictable threat of future violence toward women. 212
Even so, many commentators defend the provocation doctrine at least in some
circumstances. Several feminist critics recognize that provocation can appropri
ately mitigate the culpability of some women who kill their abusive partners, even
when those killings fall short of self-defense. 213 Moreover, there is no doubt that a
sexual betrayal by a spouse or long-time intimate partner can inflict profound
emotional and psychological trauma. In at least some cases, a response of extreme
anger may be appropriate in response to sexual infidelity.
Feminists have rightly pointed to cases in which the provocation doctrine has
wrongly served to partly excuse a defendant who has no rightful claim on our
sympathies. At the same time, there are other cases involving infidelity in which
the defendant's extreme emotional response seems more appropriate, in which the
provocation claim should be available. 214 The right normative question is whether
the defendant's extreme emotional response was blameworthy-whether the
reasons the defendant became extremely angry reflected blameworthy traits or
beliefs, such as gender hierarchy.
Consider the infamous case of People v. Berry, 215 criticized by many as showing
the provocation doctrine at its worst. 216 Berry held that the twenty-hour period
between the victim's alleged provocation and the defendant's act of killing was not
too long to merit a provocation instruction. 217 Notwithstanding this relatively
lengthy period, and the rule that provocation is unavailable if there was an
adequate "cooling off' period, the court concluded that "the long course of
provocatory conduct [by the victim], which had resulted in intermittent outbreaks
of rage under specific provocation in the past, reached its final culmination in the

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Coker. supra note 18. at 76.
Id. at 90--94. 128-29.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 90--94. 128-29.
See LEE. supra note 9. at 252; Nourse. supra note 17. at 1366-67.
An example of one such case. discussed below. is People v. Le. 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976).
LEE. supra note 9. at 17-19; Coker. supra note 18. at 118-28; Mahoney. supra note 18. at 78-79.
556 P.2d at 781.
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apartment when [she] began screaming." 218
In the case, Albert Berry, age 46, married the much younger Rachel Passah, a
20-year old Israeli woman. 219 Three days after the wedding, Rachel left and
traveled alone back to Israel, returning to California after about six weeks. 220
Albert testified that upon her return, Rachel informed him she had fallen in love
with, and slept with, a man in Israel (named Yako). 221 According to Albert, what
followed was "a tormenting two weeks in which Rachel alternately taunted
defendant with her involvement with Yako and at the same time sexually excited
defendant, indicating her desire to remain with him." 222
Ten days after her return from Israel, Albert choked Rachel so severely that she
became unconscious. 223 She was treated at a hospital and reported the attack to San
Francisco police. Soon after, a warrant was issued for Albert's arrest. 224 While
Rachel was in the hospital, Albert took his clothes and moved out of their
apartment. 225
Within a day or two, Albert went back to the apartment to talk with Rachel, but
she was not present. 226 He slept at the apartment, waiting for her, and she returned
the next morning around 11 a.m. 227 When Rachel returned and saw Albert, she
said, "I suppose you have come here to kill me." Albert responded "yes," then
"no," and then "yes" again. 228 Rachel began screaming, they struggled, and Albert
"finally ... strangled her with a telephone cord." 229
The California Supreme Court reversed Berry's conviction for murder in the
first degree, accepting Berry's argument that he was entitled to a provocation
instruction based on these facts. 230
Donna Coker argues that the court allowed the provocation defense to be used to
mitigate a killing based on factors that, in reality, showed the defendant to be more
culpable, not less culpable. 231 Berry's defense expert in essence blamed the
victim-Rachel-for the blameworthy attitudes and misconduct of the defendant.
Berry's past "propensity to assault wives and lovers under circumstances in which
he claimed the woman's infidelity provoked him" was used to claim that Rachel
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abused and exploited a "weakness" of Berry's. 232 "The defense portrayed Rachel
as a vindictive-albeit confused-woman who sexually used and abused Berry in
order to gain her own death." 233
In reality, Coker points out, "the truth is that Berry didn't kill Rachel until it
appeared that she might make good on her threat to leave him." 234
In Berry, the court failed to properly assess whether Berry's reasons for
becoming extremely angry at Rachel manifested an appropriate respect for the
interests of others. As Coker and others have explained, Berry's anger stemmed in
large part from Rachel's decision to leave him, and his improper-blameworthy
impulse to control her.
Victoria Nourse likewise highlights a series of cases in which juries were
instructed on provocation or "extreme emotional disturbance," even though the
facts showed that the defendant's anger and rage reflected his desire to control his
current or former partner, and a refusal to allow her to choose to leave him. 235 To
the extent the facts show that a defendant's rage is the result of beliefs in gender
hierarchy and female submission, he should be denied an instruction on provoca
tion because those beliefs fail to manifest appropriate respect for the interests of
others-the freedom of women to choose their intimate associations and living
arrangements.
In some other cases falling into the same general category-men claiming
provocation due to female infidelity-the facts paint a very different picture, and
show a legitimate grounds for allowing provocation claims because they do not
rest on objectionable norms of male control and female submission. For example,
in People v. Le, defendant Johnny Viet Le killed Van Truoung (known as Thang)
who had been having an affair with Le's wife, Nga Pham. 236 Le and Pham met and
were married in Vietnam, and came to the United States in 1989. 237 They had three
children together, and Pham testified that Le "was a 'very good husband,' that he
loved her 'a lot,' and that 'after 21 years of marriage, he never raise his hand on
me.'"23s
Pham began having an affair with Thang around 2002. Le discovered the affair
in November, but the couple was able to work things out. Pham testified she
promised Le she would stop the affair, and Le cut off a portion of one of his fingers
as a symbol of forgiveness and starting anew. 239

232. Id. at 120-24.
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Notwithstanding these events, the affair continued, and Pham loaned Thang
$10,000. 240 Le again learned about the affair, and began monitoring Pham's phone
calls and movements. 241 In 2003, Le and Pham traveled (with their children) to
Vietnam, where Le told Pham's parents about the affair. 242 Pham's parents
implored her to stop seeing Thang, and Pham again promised to terminate the
affair. 243
Le again learned of the affair, and shaved his head and considered becoming a
monk. He asked Pham for a divorce, but she refused. In May 2003, they decided to
move the family to Texas. 244 During the drive, Thang called Pham on her cell
phone. She put the phone on speakerphone so Le (and another relative in the car)
could hear. Thang asked for $10,000 for a trip to Vietnam and for money to start a
business, and also asked if she had life insurance. 245
In mid-May, Le and Pham returned to California to get their children, who had
stayed behind to finish school. Le told Pham he wanted to contact Thang and meet
with him, in the hopes of convincing Thang to terminate his relationship with
Pham. Pham did not want Le to meet with Thang, and Le became extremely angry,
believing that Pham still loved Thang. 246
Le went for a bicycle ride and bought a meat cleaver. He set up a meeting with
Thang, and then attacked and killed him with the cleaver. 247 Soon after, Le turned
himself in to the police. 248
The defense called an expert in "cross-cultural psychiatry," Paul Leung. Leung
"described the differences between acute and chronic stress and the importance of
'saving face' in Asian culture." 249 He testified about how long-term, chronic stress
could "bring a person to act rationally while in the process of committing an
irrational act. " 250
The defense objected to a jury instruction stating that "mere words" can never
constitute adequate provocation. The jury convicted Le of second-degree murder.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that this instruction
was erroneous and that the evidence in the case supported an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter under the provocation doctrine. 251
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For present purposes, the case illustrates how the blameworthiness principle
serves to distinguish cases in which the provocation doctrine should not be
available from cases in which it should.
In one sense, Le's case fits into the long line of cases in which men commit a
homicide in response to infidelity by a wife or intimate partner (in this case, Le
killed his wife's lover rather than his wife). As critics have argued, the men in
many of these types of cases should not receive a provocation instruction. 252 But
Le's case, in my view, clearly merits a provocation instruction.
Unlike many such cases, Le's extreme anger related to his wife's infidelity does
not seem to reflect blameworthy beliefs or personality traits. The evidence did not
show that Le was a jealous and possessive man. He did not abuse his wife, seek to
control her, or seek to prevent her from ending her relationship with him. On the
contrary, he repeatedly sought to reconcile with her. He traveled with her to
Vietnam to try to enlist her family's help in mending their relationship. He took the
extraordinary step of cutting off part of one of his own fingers as a serious symbol
of forgiveness and reconciliation. When problems persisted after all of these steps,
he sought to end their relationship with a divorce, which she resisted. There was no
evidence he had a volatile temper.
Moreover, the cultural testimony in Le's case did not ask the jury to accept or
endorse blameworthy cultural norms, as in some other cases. In R. v. Humaid, the
defendant in essence wanted the jury to view the provocation from the perspective
of a "reasonable conservative Islamic man," in particular (according to the
defendant) a reasonable man from a culture that was "male dominated, preoccu
pied with the concept of 'family honour,' and particularly intolerant of female
infidelity." 253
In contrast, Le's expert did not seek to invoke patriarchal cultural norms to
justify Le's anger. Rather, he described the norm of "saving face" in Asian
cultures, and described how a person might seem to be acting rationally while still
being in the midst of extreme emotion. These cultural or psychological features
assuming the jury is persuaded that they exist-are not blameworthy. The Asian
cultural norms regarding "saving face" may be different than prevailing norms in
the United States. They may not be affirmatively shared by most Americans. Yet
norms of "saving face" do not seem affirmatively blameworthy-they do not seem
to place insufficient weight on the legitimate interests of others.
Some of the most difficult cases-both for our intuitions and for a clear
conceptual framework-involve circumstances in which the defendant is partly
but not entirely blameworthy for becoming extremely angry. In these cases, the

252. See supra note 204.
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"blameworthiness" test identifies the proper normative standard that lawyers,
courts, and juries should use to evaluate competing claims.
One notable case involving partial blameworthiness is Bedder v. Director of
Public Prosecutions, 254 discussed by many commentators. 255 Bedder was an
eighteen-year-old man who knew he was impotent. 256 He went to a prostitute to
have sex, and predictably failed to perform. The prostitute jeered at him for his
failure, and tried to leave. Bedder held on to her; she hit and kicked him in
response. He then stabbed her to death. 257
Victoria Nourse notes that "[t]raditionally, scholars have had great sympathy for
the youthful defendant but have had trouble defending the proposition that
impotence is a characteristic of a reasonable person." 258 Feminist scholars, in
contrast, have "seen this sympathy as another example of the law bowing to male
concerns about virility." 259
Nourse evaluates the case under her proposed standard-namely, whether "the
defendant appeals to the very emotions to which the state appeals to rationalize its
own use of violence." 260 Applying that rule, Nourse argues that "because the
defendant's virility was a matter of particular sensitivity to him" (rather than a
concern shared by the broader community, as reflected in the law), the "jury should
have been instructed that it could not return a manslaughter verdict." 261
At the same time, Nourse concedes that "there is a possible claim for compas
sion in Bedder," grounded in the "unstated analogy between Bedder and those who
are victimized for their attributes; that is, because of their handicap, race, or
sex." 262 On the other hand, even if Bedder's case is viewed as a "handicap,"
Bedder might still be faulted for "blaming the victim for his own handicap." 263
Nourse concludes that framing the issue this way "does not require us to ask
whether impotence is a characteristic of a reasonable person, nor does it ignore the
potential for biased generalizations (of men or women). It exposes the judgments
so that a choice may be made." 264
The "blameworthiness" standard guides this normative judgment, as well as
helping to isolate and separate the issues for the parties and the fact- finder. As
Nourse recognizes, Bedder's reason for becoming extremely angry can be charac
terized in a variety of ways:
254. [1954] 2AllER 801. 1WLR1119 (UK).
255. See, e.g.. Nourse. supra note 17. at 1402-03; Westen. supra note 8. at 149-50; Meir Dan-Cohen.
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1. Male Chauvinism: Bedder became enraged because of a male chauvinism
that found it impertinent for a woman (who should be submissive) to mock
the sexual performance of a man (who should be dominant).
2. Physical Disability: Bedder became enraged because the victim made fun
of him for a physical disability over which he had no control.
3. Sexual Hubris: Bedder became enraged because he felt humiliation at
failing to perform sexually, and he "took out" his humiliation on the victim
even though she was not to blame for his failure and he had knowingly
sought out the encounter that led to his predictable humiliation.
4. Failure to be Masculine: Bedder became enraged because the victim made
fun of him for failing to meet her expectations of "stereotypical sexual
performance standards for adult males." 265

Of course, it could be the case that some or all of these explanations are present
at the same time. Perhaps the victim invoked sexual stereotypes (Failure to be
Masculine), but that taunting was particularly effective against Bedder because he
himself already had a strongly held belief in sexual stereotypes (Male Chauvin
ism). It is in this way that we see Bedder as a possible example of "partially
blameworthy" motivations. It could be the case that Bedder's motivations were
partly blameworthy, and partly not blameworthy.
In part the dispute in Bedder is factual-what reason(s) really prompted
Bedder's extreme anger? In a case before a jury, the prosecutor and the defense
lawyer might well try to characterize Bedder's extreme anger in some of the
different ways suggested above, or might come up with additional and perhaps
more persuasive interpretations of what prompted his anger. The "blameworthi
ness" standard frames the arguments a prosecutor or a defense lawyer would make;
it serves as the benchmark against which the jury must evaluate those competing
characterizations.
After the factual questions are resolved, the normative question remains-were
those reasons blameworthy?
If Bedder's anger stems from a beliefthat woman should be sexually submissive
and males sexually dominant (Male Chauvinism)-and the victim violated those
norms by taunting him over a matter of male sexual performance-then his anger
stems from a blameworthy attitude of male sexual dominance over females.
If Bedder's anger stems from personal humiliation that he "took out" on the
victim (Sexual Hubris), that anger is likewise blameworthy. His sense of humilia
tion is not blameworthy, but his emotional response to translate humiliation into
anger at a person who did not wrongfully cause that humiliation is blameworthy.
That is particularly true in a case like this, in which Bedder himself chose the
encounter he knew would risk his own humiliation.

265. Id. at 1402.
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At the same time, Bedder is not at fault for being impotent. If his anger stems
from being mocked for a physical disability (Physical Disability), that anger is not
a blameworthy emotional response-just as a person who is blind is not blamewor
thy if she becomes angry at being mocked for her lack of sight.
If Bedder's anger was prompted by the prostitute's invocation of stereotypical
male sexual performance standards (Failure to be Masculine), his anger is likewise
not blameworthy. There is a very fine line between this way of characterizing
things and the first reason, "Male Chauvinism." In the first case, it is Bedder
himself who holds sexist stereotypes about male and female sexual roles and
performance, and it is his own sexist stereotypes that provoke his anger. In this
case, however, it is not Bedder but the victim who invokes blameworthy sexual
stereotypes.
In the end, it seems that Bedder's anger is partly defensible as an appropriate
(non-blameworthy) response to being taunted for a physical disability, and also is
partly blameworthy. The extreme nature of Bedder's anger seems hard to explain
based only on the taunting for a physical disability. What more plausibly led to
Bedder's extreme anger was his blameworthy fury at being humiliated-a humili
ation he brought upon himself-as well as the affront to his masculinity by a
woman. If those blameworthy motivations are removed from the situation, it does
not seem likely that the provocation was sufficient to incite a reasonable person
into extreme anger.
Feminists have made convincing claims that the provocation doctrine has, too
often, wrongly been available to mitigate punishment for men who are highly
violent and pose a serious risk of danger to women in the future-men whose
anger stems from inappropriate cultural stereotypes of masculinity and gender
hierarchy. 266 Judges and juries should reject provocation claims to the extent the
defendant's reason for becoming extremely angry is blameworthy-for example,
when it stems from cultural stereotypes of masculinity and gender hierarchy. At the
same time, some cases do not reflect those blameworthy rationales, and in those
cases the provocation doctrine should be available.
B. Gay Panic, Trans Panic, and Blameworthiness

Another controversial and much-criticized use of the provocation doctrine is in
the context of so-called "gay panic" or "trans panic" cases. 267 Joshua Dressler
refers to "gay panic" cases with the more neutral formulation of "nonviolent
homosexual advance," or NHA, cases. 268
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Robert Mison argues that a nonviolent sexual advance by a person of the same
sex should never be viewed as "sufficient provocation." 269 Permitting the provoca
tion claim in a "gay panic" case, he argues, is "a misguided application of
provocation theory and a judicial institutionalization of homophobia." 270 He
argues that a correct application of the "reasonable person" standard would dictate
this result: "a reasonable person should not be provoked to kill by such an advance.
The reasonable man should not possess prejudices and biases such as homophobia
and heterosexism." 271 He therefore concludes that judges should "find as a matter
of law that a homosexual advance is insufficient provocation," and thus prohibit
juries from considering this claim. 272
Similar arguments have been made in so-called "trans panic" cases, in which the
defendant claims "that his violent acts were triggered by the revelation that another
person, sometimes with whom he has been sexually involved, is transgendered." 273
Joshua Dressler responds that Mison's categorical rule is misplaced. Dressler
argues that in some cases in which men are provoked during a sexual advance from
another man, a manslaughter instruction may be appropriate. 274 Dressler agrees
with Mison in part. For one, Dressler claims that "the Reasonable Man in NHA
cases is not homophobic." 275
At the same time, Dressler argues that "[i]t is not necessarily the case that a
person who kills after a NHA does so as the result of intolerance, bigotry, or
homophobia." 276 As a general matter, "an unwanted sexual advance is a basis for
justifiable indignation." 277 The appropriateness of the response-how extreme the
anger is-depends on the nature of the sexual advance. For example, "[i ]fa victim
lightly touches a defendant on the shoulder and asks, 'Do you want to have sex
with me?,' such a solicitation should not result in an instruction on manslaugh
ter."278 In contrast, Dressler argues that "[m]ost men-including non-homophobic
heterosexuals and gay men-would justifiably become indignant if a stranger
nonconsensually touched their genitals, fondled their buttocks, or committed a
sexual act upon them while they slept. " 279 Dressler concludes that judges should
instruct juries to evaluate whether legitimate indignation caused the defendant's
extreme emotional response, while trying to prevent juries from returning a
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manslaughter verdict based on homophobia. 280
Cynthia Lee likewise prefers for such normative questions to be aired before the
jury, along with judicial instructions that jurors "should try not to let" norms such
as "masculinity norms, heterosexuality norms, and race norms ... bias their
decision making." 281
Notwithstanding some disagreements, it is notable that Mison, Dressler, and Lee
all agree that if a defendant killed in response to a non-violent homosexual
advance because of the defendant's homophobia, or prejudice toward homosexual
ity, that defendant should be convicted of murder, not the lesser charge of
manslaughter. 282
A general conceptual explanation of this point of agreement is that acting out of
fear, prejudice, or hatred toward homosexuality is blameworthy. In contrast,
several of the other possible motivations that Dressler mentions are not blamewor
thy. It is appropriate to respond with indignation to an unwanted sexual advance. If
that sexual advance involves a physical violation of one's body, even stronger
indignation is warranted. In a sufficiently egregious case, it may be appropriate to
respond with extreme anger.
Of course, in most cases it seems hard to explain a response of extreme anger to
a nonviolent homosexual advance without reference to a deep-seated hatred or fear
of homosexuality. If the defendant's blameworthy homophobia is the key factor
that turned what might have been moderate indignation into extreme, violent rage,
then it is wrong to mitigate the defendant's act of killing from murder to
manslaughter. The defendant lost his temper, and would not have lost it-not in the
extreme way that he did-had he "manifest[ed] appropriate respect ... for the
interests of others." 283
The blameworthiness test should also be applied in so-called "trans panic"
cases, in which a defendant kills an intimate partner upon discovering that the
partner is transgender. 284 To date, most commentators agree that certain types of
motivations in these cases are normatively blameworthy, and thus should not form
a basis for adequate provocation: claims that the defendant responded with anger
due to a hatred and disgust for trans gender persons, or took offense at a violation of
traditional gender roles. 285
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Some, however, have argued that there may be adequate provocation in some
cases on a theory of sexual deception: that it is reasonable to react with anger (even
extreme anger) upon discovering that an intimate partner, believed to be a woman,
is biologically a male. 286 Bradford Bigler argues that this type of sexual deception
can reasonably give rise to extreme emotion, due to justified feelings of betrayal of
one's sexual autonomy. 287
Other commentators disagree. Victoria Steinberg argues that "revealing one's
biological sex does not constitute sufficient provocation." 288 Cynthia Lee and
Peter Kwan likewise conclude that "it is not normatively appropriate to be
outraged by the discovery that one's intimate partner is a transgender person." 289
The blameworthiness standard serves several functions in this dispute. First,
some types of motivation in transgender cases can be clearly identified as
blameworthy, such as transphobia or the enforcement of traditional gender roles.
On the remaining issue of sexual deception, commentators have a genuine
normative disagreement about whether a sexual deception of this type is a
sufficient ground for responding in extreme anger. The blameworthiness standard
does not itself resolve this dispute, and I do not purport to resolve it here.
Nevertheless, the standard correctly frames the normative question: is a response
of extreme anger, due to being deceived about the biological sex of one's intimate
partner, an appropriate or a blameworthy emotional response?
CONCLUSION

The current provocation doctrine suffers from a deep conceptual problem-a
failure to identify which features of a particular defendant are properly relevant
when assessing the adequacy of provocation, and which features are not relevant.
Commentators to date have failed to "provide a principled theory by which to
distinguish those characteristics with which the law should individualize from
those with which it should not." 290
This article identifies the general solution to this puzzle: provocation is not
reasonable if the reason the defendant became extremely angry is due to some
blameworthy belief or attribute of the defendant. This principle-blameworthiness
distinguishes those aspects of the defendant that cannot form a basis for him to
argue he was reasonably provoked from those aspects that can properly form the
basis of a provocation claim.
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The "blameworthiness" principle resolves, at a conceptual level, disputes over
which cultural or other traits of a defendant should be "imported" onto the
"reasonable person." It does so by reframing the issue: the jury should take the
defendant as he is, considering all of his beliefs, traits, and attributes, and then
determine whether the reason the defendant became extremely angry is blamewor
thy. This same principle identifies the correct normative standard against which to
judge provocation claims in recurring, controversial contexts, such as men who
kill their intimate partners, persons who kill in response to a same-sex sexual
advance, or persons who kill after discovering their intimate partner is transgender.
In each case, the decision-maker (whether judge, jury, or legislature) should focus
on determining why the defendant became extremely angry and reject any reasons
that are normatively blameworthy.
A defendant who pleads provocation asks the community to mitigate his
wrongful act of killing from murder to manslaughter, and to do so because another
person provoked him into a rage that made it much more difficult to control his
violent response. But if the defendant's reason for becoming angry is blamewor
thy, he has no rightful claim to mitigation-he is culpably responsible for entering
the state of extreme anger that might otherwise reduce his culpability.
The principle of "blameworthiness" does not provide ready solutions in all
cases. In a diverse, pluralistic society, individuals will disagree about which
attributes or reasons are blameworthy. Those disagreements might be resolved (or
partly resolved) by legislatures or by courts, or left to juries. But the principle of
blameworthiness solves the conceptual puzzle and provides the proper normative
framework for channeling these disputes.

